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Through historical and comparative analysis this study demonstrates how 
and why an agrarian system has been reproduced in modem China and how that 
legacy strongly influences post-revolutionary political structure and ideology. The 
agrarian legacy also helps explain China's difficulty in establishing a capitalist 
market structure, an industrialized economy, and a more democratic political 
system. The analysis draws heavily upon recent work by Lenski, Lenski, and 
Nolan (1991) on ecological evolutionary theory. 
A primary source of evidence in this research is my own personal 
experience as a native of China. Other sources include: comparative data for 
agrarian societies from Murdock and White's (1969) Standard Cross°Cultural 
Sample (SCCS), Tuden and Marshall's (1972) political organizational codes for 
the societies in the SCCS, and a number of literary and historical documents. 
This research begins with an examination of the political structure and 
ideology of imperial China. The analysis shows that throughout its long history 
China has clearly demonstrated political and ideological features consistent with 
other agrarian societies. Second, this research illustrates that Maoism as a 
dominant ideology" in modem China served a similar function as Confucianism 
in imperial China. These ideologies (Maoism and Confucianism) validated the 
political power of China's emperors and ruling class. Ideological currents and 
the agrarian legacy have significantly slowed the development of rational-legal 
vii 
authority. So while China has demonstrated economic growth and industriali-
zation, it has not developed a commensurate political and economic structure as 
predicted, for example, by the theories of Max Weber (1947). Third, this study 
explores "the second revolution" (Harding 1986) of post-Maoist China to reform 
its political and economic structure toward a more rational-legal form. 
This study finds that the Chinese polity has l)een slow to achieve rational-
legal forms that characterize the polities of the advanced industrial societies 
because China's technological base remains largely agrarian. It also fmds that 
current political economic reforms in post-Maoist China continue to press for 
economic growth and development but remain conservative in promoting political 
change so as to maintain a tight social order. IBtimately, I believe that 
industrialization, changes in the demographics of the labor force, and economic 
growth will eventually produce broader changes in the political system. Political 
liberalization and more democratic political institutions will come to China, but 
gradually as a result of increasing industrialization. 







This study will show that Imperial China was a classic agrarian society. It 
will argue that the agrarian political structure and ideology have been reproduced 
in post-revolutionary China. Also I consider the ways in which traditional and 
charismatic authority of the agrarian polity has begun to change toward one based 
on more rational-legal principles in recent China. 
One key to understanding contemporary Chinese political structure and 
ideology is to view them in terms of the legacies of imperial China's polity 
founded in B.C. 221. More than two thousand years of traditional bureaucracy 
is finnly rooted in Chinese political structure. Even though the Chinese 
Communist Party has held power since 1949, it has still, in most respects, 
continued the imperial tradition; and traditional Chinese political ideology has 
been reproduced in an altered symbolic form. Whether it was the imperial 
emperor or the Communist paramount leaders, all considered that the dominant 
ideology played an indispensable function to keep social harmony and stability. 
One insisted on Confucianism, the other upholds Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought. 
Both deeply feared that change would bring about social chaos. To some extent, 
there was no Chinese revolution, but only another traditional bureaucratic 
restoration with new elements. 
Therefore, it is important to know the characteristics of imperial Chinese 
political structure which are based on the typical features of agrarian society. 
Also, we should realize how important it has become for Chinese Communist 
government to adopt pragmatic policies and new structures in order to modernize 
its national economy. Under this situation, an interesting question is how post-
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· Maoist China gradually refonns its traditional and charismatic authority structures 
toward a more rational-legal authority. 
In this study, I will adhere to the following questions and themes: 
L Traditional . agrarian China may reveal more about social order and 
political stability than any other society. The Chinese imperial system was the 
most enduring major political system in world history. What are the fundamental 
factors which allowed this "pennanent dynastic system" to survive? 
2. As an advanced, highly developed agrarian society, why is it that imperial 
China could create a great integrated political bureaucracy in its early history? 
Why did it stagnate at that level? 
3. Although a dramatic revolution occurred in China to smash the imperial 
political structure, why does post-revolutionary China still reflect traditional 
legacies? Why do the agrarian "remnants" still exert a strong influence on 
contemporary China? 
4. What factors explain an under-developed and inefficient bureaucratic 
system in China? How can post-Maoist China face the rapidly changing world 
and refonn its political and economic system toward a more rational-legal fonn? 
5. Ideology has always played an indispensable function in Chinese political 
life, both in the imperial era's Confucianism and in post-revolutionary China's 
Maoism and "four principles". How do these dominant ideologies work in the 
political structure? 
"AgrarianSociety" As a Theoretical Construct 
This study depends upon the method of political sociology--the sociological 
study of political processes and political systems (Eisenstadt 1971). It seeks to 
describe and explicate the characteristics of agrarian societies, and to analyze the 
development and change of the Chinese polity from the imperial era to 
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contemporary times. To accomplish this it relies on Lenski's model of "agrarian 
society" and "industrializing agrarian society" to explain why post-revolutionary 
China has inherited the agrarian polity of the imperial era. Therefore it discusses 
how the agrarian legacy still strongly influences Chinese political structure and 
the ideology of post-revolutionary China. 
1. Typology of societies based upon subsistence technology 
Most human societies have changed little during their course of existence. 
But it is clear that some societies have grown substantially, some have shifted 
from a nomadic way of life to permanent settlements in villages, and some have 
shifted from a predominantly rural mode of life to a predominantly urban one. 
Such changes have usually been accompanied by important changes in social 
organization, such as substantial increases in organizational complexity, the 
division oflabor, and social inequality. In short, some societies have experienced 
a process of substantial growth and development while others have not (Lenski 
et al. 1991, p. 60). 
According to Lenski, production technology plays the most critical part in 
societal growth and development, because "an advance in subsistence technology 
is a necessary precondition for a significant increase in the size and complexity 
of a society", and "technology defines the limits of what is possible for a society" 
(Lenski et al. 1991, p. 60). On the basis of subsistence technology, the patterns 
of social organization change. The different types of political structure and 
ideology of societies are also influenced by production technology. Arguing in 
this way leads Lenski to classify human societies based upon their subsistence 
technologies. In accordance with their primary mode of subsistence, human 
societies are divided into ten basic categories (Lenski et al. 1991, p. 70): 
Hunting and gathering societies 
4 
Simple horticultural societies 
Advanced horticultural societies 
Simple agrarian societies 
Advanced agrarian societies 
Fishing societies 
Maritime societies 
Simple herding societies 
Advanced herding societies 
Industrial societies 
"A society is classified as a hunting and gathering society 
only if the hunting of wild animals and foraging for uncultivated 
plant foods are its primary means of subsistence. Horticultural 
societies are societies which practice farming, but do not have 
plows. Agrarian societies engage in farming, but they use plows. 
Advanced agrarian societies use iron tools and weapons, while 
simple agrarian societies have only copper and bronze, which are 
softer metals and less plentiful" (Lenski et al. 1991, pp. 70-1). 
Fishing, herding, and maritime societies are different from the other types 
of societies in that they are environmentally specialized types, although the 
development of these societies still depended on their subsistence technologies. 
Industrial societies are the newest type of society and technologically the 
most advanced. The distinguishing feature of these societies is their heavy 
dependence on machine technology and inanimate sources of energy. Because 
of their highly advanced technology, industrial societies are the most powerful and 
productive societies the world has seen to date. This situation determines the 
difference between pre-industrial societies and industrial societies. 
It is important to point out that not all societies fit neatly into the ten 
types of societies mentioned above. Some are hybrids that combine in roughly 
equal proportions the characteristics of two or more of the basic types. Lenski 
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considers, often--though not always--that hybrid societies are in a state of 
transition form one mode of production to another and from one level of 
development to another. Therefore, many lesser-developed societies today are 
beginning to industrialize. But they still depend heavily on preindustrial 
technology, which also determines their social, political, and economic structures. 
Some of these can be characterized as industrializing agrarian societies. 
2. General political and ideological features of agrarian society 
In nearly all advanced agrarian societies, government was the basic 
integrating force. Coercion was necessary to hold things together and maintain 
the benefit of a tiny elite. It was important to agrarian societies to have a strong 
military force. Most advanced agrarian societies had a monarchy headed by a 
king or emperor whose position was usually hereditary. "Agrarian rulers and 
governing classes saw nothing immoral in the use of what we (not they) would 
call 'public office' for private gain. To them, it was simply the legitimate use of 
their 'patrimony'" (Lenski et al. 1991, p. 78). 
The king or emperor naturally wanted the greatest possible control over 
his subordinates, so he held supreme authority. Another faction in advanced 
agrarian societies was an authoritarian bureaucracy shot through with kinship ties, 
nepotism, and favoritism. Thus, bureaucracy was another indispensable faction 
in the agrarian polity and it deeply influenced the political process in nearly every 
agrarian society. An excellent case study is Antonio's ''Authoritarian Bureaucracy 
in Ancient Rome " (1986). It clearly illustrates the characteristic_s of an advanced 
agrarian society. Rome, through its bureaucracy, organized the society into a 
structure of extraction and coercion, but this also generated responses from 
below. An elaborate network of patron-client relationships provided means to 
avert extraction and arbitrary impositions of power. A dynamic of state control 
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and clientelistic adjustment resulted. 
From ancient Rome's example, we find that the state apparatus was small 
and highly personal. Unlike modem governmental bureaucracy, appointment, 
advancement, and day-to-day functioning depended largely on personal loyalty 
derived from familial, friendship, and dependency relations. Offices were created 
in an ad hoc manner, lacked legal jurisdiction, and did not usually require special 
training. Political structural differentiation was part of a broader process of 
centralization that concentrated complete power in the hands of the emperor 
(Antonio 1986). This kind of bureaucracy built upon and perpetuated a complex, 
vertical class and status hierarchy. A similar situation can be found in imperial 
China. 
Furthermore, the Roman emperor relied on the high aristocracy for 
political support, advisors, and official appointees. Beneath the high aristocracy 
was the curial order (decurious) who occupied positions on prestigious city 
councils (municipal senates) and held the important magistracies. In imperial 
China, royal family members, eunuchs, and certain levels of literati composed a 
similar hierarchical structure. 
The patron-client relationship (patronage or clientelism) became the key 
link of the authoritarian bureaucracy of ancient Rome. It was based on 
submission and loyalty, extraction and mutual assistance. Clients served their 
patron and received protection and assistance in return. Patrons represented 
their clients in court, provided them subsistence, or exerted influence to promote 
their careers. Patronage promoted stable domination by establishing bonds and 
reciprocities that cut across the vertical class and status hierarchies. Patronage 
was the basis of official appointment because everything was done 'from above' 
and people had to depend upon their allies (Antonio 1986). The emperor 
appointed his 'friends' and clients, who in tum appointed their 'friends' and 
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clients. The network of patron-client alliances suffused the bureaucracy and the 
wider society. Finally, since promotion reflected patronage networks, this skewed 
the appointment process strongly toward loyalty and personalism, and away from 
uniform emphasis on professional training, merit, seniority, specialization, and 
legal jurisdiction (Saller 1980; Cotton 1981; see Antonio 1986, p. 30). 
These features match Udy's characterization of "informal organization"--a 
type of traditional organizational hierarchy that departs significantly from Weber's 
ideal-typical bureal)cracy (Udy 1959). The features of authoritarian bureaucracy 
of ancient Rome exhibited many informal arrangements, such as lack legal 
jurisdiction, personalism, patrimonialism, nepotism, clientelism, etc. The informal 
characteristics of the authoritarian bureaucracy reflected characteristics of the 
wider agrarian society: the dispersed economic resource base with relatively 
inefficient transportation and communications, the huge peasant population, and 
the lack of resources to finance a more formalized bureaucracy (Antonio 1986). 
This situation is still found within industrializing agrarian societies. 
The ideology of agrarian societies was founded upon the universal faiths, 
which played an indispensable function in maintaining societal unity, such as 
Buddhism in South F.ast Asia, Confucianism in China, and Christianity in Europe. 
Religion offered ruling dynasties a strong basis to legitimate their supreme power. 
For example, the doctrine of the 'Divine Right of Kings' prevailed in European 
countries prior to the industrial era, and the Roman emperor was worshiped as 
god. Eisenstdat calls this kind of ideology a "totalistic ideology" (1966, p. 105). 
"In advanced agrarian society, the single most important 
consequence of an increase in economic surplus was further growth 
of the state and in the power of the governing class that controlled 
it. This contributed, directly or indirectly, to most of the other 
important social and cultural changes of the agrarian era. It lay 
behind the shift from militia to professional armies; the increase in 
inequality, and the development of ideologies justifying inequality 
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and the power of elites; the rise of the merchant class and the 
increase in trade and commerce; the growth of urban populations; 
the increase in the division of labor; and the slowing of the rate of 
innovation" (Lenski et al. 1991, p. 200). 
In a word, the agrarian subsistence technology determined social evolution 
and development. It also determined the characteristics of agrarian polity and 
ideology (see chart 1). 
Chart 1. The Relationship Between Subsistence Technology and Agrarian Polity 
Agrarian Polity: 
Agrarian Subsistence determined sovereign emperor or king 
Technology: traditional,charismatic authority 
plow agriculture centralized executive force 
large rural population < strong police,military function 
low productive force based on patrimonialism,clientelism 
totalistic ideology 
3. The transition to industrializing agrarian societies 
Despite the rapid spread of industrialization during the last two centuries, 
less than a quarter of the world's population lives in societies that can be 
considered highly industrialized. The great majority, however, do live in societies 
that have been substantially altered as a consequence of the diffusion of modem 
industrial technology. These hybrid societies are best described as industrializing 
societies---the ones commonly referred to as the developing nations of the Third 
World (Lenski et al. 1991). Many of these nations are in a transitional phase, 
moving from an agrarian way of life to a modem industrial O!].e. The industria-
lizing agrarian societies (including China, India, countries in the Middle East, 
Latin American, and Eastern Europe) combine elements of both the agrarian 
past and the industrial present. 
In industrializing agrarian societies, one of the greatest hindrances to 
development has been the kind of governing class they inherited from the past. 
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This class enjoyed a privileged status for centuries, and its members have seldom 
shown any desire to change things in the twentieth century. From their perspec-
tive, change is something to be resisted, or, when possible, exploited for their 
personal benefit (Lenski et al. 1991). But there are many differences among 
these industrializing societies. The political systems they have developed during 
this century are widely varying, some have adopted the model of Western industri 
al democracy, others have followed the model of socialism or communism. 
In my presentation, I will use Lenski's model sketched above to analyze 
how the Chinese case falls into his model of "agrarian society" and "industrializing 
agrarian society". 
Sources of Evidence 
A primary source of evidence is my own personal experience as a native 
Chinese from Sichuan province. I will also use a number of secondary sources, 
books, articles, etc which describe imperial and contemporary China. Some 
comparative data for agrarian societies come from Murdock and White's (1969) 
Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS) and Tuden and Marshall's (1972) 
political organizational codes for the societies in the SCCS. 
Plan of the Study 
This study is divided into three parts. In the first part, the Ideology and 
Political Structure in Imperial China, I will describe imperial political 
characteristics and show how these relate to the typical features of an agrarian 
polity. In the second part, Post-Revolutionary China, I will discuss how the 
political structure of modem China resembles that of the Imperial era. I will also 
emphasize the dominant ideology of Maoism and the political rituals that helped 
to sustain it. Concluding this part I discuss the inefficiency of the Chinese 
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political structure· and process. In part 3, China After Mao, I will illustrate how 
post-Maoist China under Deng gradually reformed the political and economic 
structures, but the "second revolution" of post-Maoist China still clings to an 
ideological conservatism, despite Deng's pragmatism in areas of economic reform. 
11 
Part I Ideology and Political Structure in Imperial China 
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Chapter 1 Imperial Chinese Ideology 
China became an advanced agrarian society during the Qin dynasty, at 
which time the hnperial system, along with its patrimonial bureaucracy, was 
established. This form of government had lasted more than two thousand years. 
The basic pattern of the Chinese polity over the centuries had been that of a 
hereditary emperor who ruled with the help of literati, royal family members, and 
eunuchs. Emperors and dynasties could be and were overthrown, to be replaced 
by other emperors and other dynasties. Continuity was preserved, however, 
because from generation to generation--until the begiuning of this century--the 
literati who controlled and administrated the country shared the same values as 
their predecessors and were chosen in the same way (Schwartz 1965). Confucia-
ism provided the ideological foundation of the imperial political system; the 
literati played an indispensable function to enhance and propagate Confucianism. 
L Confucianism as a dominant ideology 
"Confucianism was remarkable because it was secular and was considered 
valid and appropriate for the problems of everyone--emperor, bureaucrat, 
landlord, and ordinary subject" (Pye 1978, p. 32). It spoke with authority about 
the common concerns of all who, like fathers, must look after their children. It 
was used as a moral code for hierarchical social relations, and served to maintain 
the patrimonial order. 
Confucius was primarily interested in how men might live together so there 
could be peace and harmony in their society as well as their personal lives. 
Confucius' teachings stressed Ren--filial piety, Li--loyalty to one's superior, and 
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De--virtuous conduct. The emphasis was on good manners and ethical conduct 
for rulers, officials, and the masses. The basic assumption was that the empire 
was essentially a huge extended family; the emperor could be regarded as the 
father, and his subjects as his children. Confucius stressed the importance of a 
virtuous ruler who set a good example by saying to one monarch: "Ifyour desire 
is for good, the people will be good. The moral character of the ruler is the 
wind; the moral character of those beneath him is the grass. When the grass has 
the wind upon it, it assuredly bends" (cited in Schwartz 1965, p. 25). 
The philosophy of Confucianism, which bade the ruler deal with the mass 
of the people as children, was essentially a code for the guidance of an absolute 
but hopefully benevolent dictatorship. That is why the Chinese people have 
always wished for a kind and benevolent emperor or paternalistic officials until 
today. Of course, this circumstance had strong parallels with the traditional 
Chinese patriarchal family system. 
Confucianism was not only a systematic philosophy of state rule, but also 
an attitude toward the universe and a quasi-religious system (Schwartz 1965). For 
example, the emperor was considered the 'Son of Heaven'. He was believed to 
be granted the right to communicate direct! y to the 'Spirit of Heaven' and to 
make sacrificial rites. Furthermore, it was the emperor's right to grant 
recognition to powerful deities as objects of worship, bestowing title and rank 
upon them or demoting them as the occasion demanded. The masses, on the 
other hand, led by the household patriarchs, worshiped their own ancestral spirits. 
Confucianism emphasized court etiquette, state ceremonies, and proper 
conduct toward one's ancestors in the famous five degrees of relationships. These 
relationships were: father\son, emperor\subject, husband\ wife, older 
brother\younger brother, and friends\friends. It aimed at social harmony and 
stability which was the cement that held society together and was supposed to be 
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a moral consensus. The building blocks that were held together by this cement 
were human bonds and mutual obligations arranged in a huge hierarchy--from 
emperor and ministers down through local officials and local gentry, and finally 
to the inunediate family--the bonds between emperor and official, father and son, 
husband and wife, brothers, and friends (Whyte 1986). 
The analogy between family and state bureaucracy 
Patriarchy, patrimonialism, and filial piety were indispensable for the 
Chinese bureaucracy. While patriarchy reflected the family system per se, 
patrimonialism extended the respect for authority toward the political center and 
toward the emperor (Son of Heaven) who was to govern the empire as a father 
governs his family. Filial piety exemplified this multilevel relationship, because 
"it was a doctrine of sincere submission, a doctrine that prescribes the superiority 
of the father's role, as well as the manner of obedience given to the person in 
that role" (Hamilton 1990, p. 77). 
It was 'Ren', 'Li' and 'De' of Confucianism that merged the patriarchal 
family system and the patrimonial bureaucracy into an organic whole to form the 
characteristics of the Chinese ideology. On the basis of man's desire and 
emotion, Confucianism proposed the highest moral principle 'Ren'. It described 
the ethical code and established the spiritual order of interpersonal relationships. 
'Ren' stands for (1) the obliteration of the individual; (2) the spirit of sacrifice; 
(3) self-restraint; (4) lack of privacy and (5) ideological control (Gong Wen-xiang 
1989, p. 365). The main content of 'Ren' is filial piety expressed toward parents, 
elders, and superiors. In the situation of the patriarchal family, the first 
important thing is filial piety. "Filial piety is the root of all virtue of 
Confucianism. Because our bodies, in every hair and bit of skin, are received by 
us from our parents, we must not venture to injure or scar them. This is the 
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beginning of filial piety." (Scharfstein 1974, p. 6, cited from The Classic of Filial 
Piety). When the moral order of patriarchy was applied to socio-political life, it 
was defined as 'Li', described as 'the way to administer a state' or 'the norms of 
appropriate behavior according to status' . 'Li ' places the stress on the 
subordinate's duty to obey, assigus role obligations that signify his or her 
submission to duty, and restricts legitimate acts of power and obedience to 
behaviors in a role set (eg. father\son, emperor\subjects, etc.). This 
depersonalized form of patriarchy is in tum justified by the belief that it is the 
duty of all individuals to conform to their roles in order to maintain the harmony 
of the whole. In the bureaucracy, loyalty to the emperor and complete obedience 
became cardinal principles. 
By emphasizing relations between 'father\son', 'emperor\subjects', etc., 
Confucianism offered strong ideological support to the emperor as well as to the 
bureaucracy with its numerous officials. As a famous philosopher Zhu Xi (AD 
1130-1200) said, "Take for instance the human heart: father-son, prince-minister, 
brothers, husband-wife, friends, these relationships are just naturally embedded 
in it. To deny these relationships was to deny one's own nature" (cited in 
Hamilton 1990, p. 95). Another philosopher Cheng Hao (AD 1032-1085) also 
pointed out that such relationships actually belong to the eternal principle of the 
cosmos from which there was no escape between heaven and earth (See 
Hamilton 1990, p. 95). 
Patriarchy was extended to become a basic principle of political as well as 
social structure. The society was seen as one vast 'extended family' ruled over by 
a paternalistic emperor, the 'Son of Heaven' and other paternalistic officials. 
Weber made note of this when he wrote "Just as patrimonialism has its genesis 
in the piety of children of the house toward the patriarch's authority, so 
Confucianism bases the subordination of the officials to the ruler, of the lower 
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to the higher-ranking officials, and particularly of the subjects to the officials and 
the ruler, on the cardinal virtue of filial piety" (cited in Hamilton 1990, p. 60). 
This is why Weber further noted that state authority as well as family authority 
in China approached the pure form, and the concept of piety, the virtue common 
to all examples of patriarchy and patrimonialism, reached its highest level ( cited 
in Hamilton 1990, p. 61). 
Therefore the legitimating ideology of the patrimonial bureaucracy was 
based on the ideology of the extended patriarchical family system. So there were 
strong roots of patrimonialism bred into the whole society. Patriarchy and 
patrimonialism merged to become typical characteristics of Chinese political 
ideology under Confucianism (See chart 2). 


















(Dotted lines represent relationships based on analogy) 
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Chapter 2 The Agrarian Polity of Imperial China 
.L. Comparison of China with other agrarian societies 
To demonstrate that the political structure of imperial and pre-
revolutionary China represents a typical agrarian polity, I have selected thirty 
agrarian societies from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample of preindustrial 
societies to identify their common political characteristics. Through this 
comparison it will be shown that China's political characteristics fall in the modal 
categories in almost every instance. 
Murdock and White (1969, the data for China was collected in 1936, See 
Murdock and White) selected 186 societies for their standard sample, and it 
includes many types of societies including hunting and gathering, horticultural, 
agrarian, and fishing and herding. Agrarian societies were distinguished from the 
other types according to the following criteria: if the reliance on plow agriculture 
accounted for more than 56 percent of the food consumed, or if the reliance on 
plow agriculture was in the range of 46-55 percent and no other mode of food 
production--such as fishing or herding--was equally important. This coding 
definition resulted in the sample of 30 agrarian societies. 
Tuden and Marshall's paper "Political Organization: Cross-Cultural Codes 
4" (1972) provided a detailed definition and presentation of coded variables in 
order to interpret the political structure of the thirty agrarian societies. I 
determined the frequency distributions for each of the political characteristics to 
find out whether or not China fell in the mode for the sample of agrarian 
societies (See Appendix 1 for complete definitions of Tuden and Marshall's 
codes). 
19 
Results of the comparative analysis 
In agrarian society, the police function played an important role to hold 
the peasant mass in check. Because most agrarian societies were united by 
military force, the government had to use some coercion to keep people together 
in certain geographical areas. Effective control of the migration of people 
became an important question to agrarian society, since labor was the cardinal 
productive force. In the sample of 30 agrarian societies, twenty-two (73.3 
percent) had police functions that were specialized and institutionalized. 
Preindustrial China is in the modal category on this variable (Table 1). 






















As a matter of fact, the data reflected the Chinese Baojia system. This 
was a neighborhood administrative system organized on the basis of households 
by which the government enforced its rule at the primary level at that time. The 
government controlled all types of information about people through the Baojia 
system. The police function of the system formed a primary basis for local 
governmental rule. 
The coded variable Levels of Sovereignty indicates the highest level of 
indigenous political integration at which functionaries have the power to enforce 
important decisions bearing on subordinate levels in the political structure (Tuden 
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and Marshall 1972). Twenty of the 30 agrarian societies (66. 7 percent) were 
coded thus: 'effective sovereignty is found at the third or higher level of political 
integration above the local community, as in the case of a large state divided into 
administrative provinces which are further subdivide into lesser administrative 
districts' (Table 2). 
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The political system of China had numerous layers. At the top was the 
emperor followed by the royal family, eunuchs, and important literati who 
composed the highest rank in the ruling pyramid. The second level was 
composed of many kinds of ministries. The third level consisted of the hierarchy 
outside of the capital of the central government, at the provincial and local levels. 
So multiple levels of sovereignty existed in the Chinese polity. Once again the 
lowest level of political organization was found in the Baojia system. 
After considering the police function and levels of sovereignty, naturally 
we will ask who is yested with decision-making power at highest level of effective 
sovereignty in agrarian societies. The coded variables of Executive and 
Deliberative and Consultative Bodies show us that most agrarian societies were 
monarchies headed by a king or emperor. There were no deliberative and 
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consultative bodies as a rule. Succession of the executive was usually hereditary 
within a ruling family or determined by a ruling clique. 
Concerning the Executive function, in more than half of the societies (53.3 
percent) the supreme decision-making authority was concentrated in a single 
authoritative leader, eg., a paramount chief, king, or emperor (Table 3). The 
Deliberative and Consultative Bodies variable reflects that in 66. 7 percent of 
societies there was an 'absence of a deliberative body' (Table 4). 
Table 3. Executive 
Value Label 
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Table 4. Deliberative and Consultative Bodies 
Value Label 
*absence deliberative body 
aristocratic deliver body 
deliberative council 
plural deliberative body 









(*China is in 











In the political structure of China, the emperor and his court were at the 
apex of a hierarchical establishment composed of a civil bureaucracy of the 
Chinese literati. The emperor had absolute decision-making power in the whole 
country, and the viceroys and governors were comparably powerful at the regional 
and provincial levels. In the local districts the dominant official was the 
magistrate. This structure based its claims of legitimacy on the hegemonical 
ideology of Confucianism, which had been the universal faith in China since 206 
B.C. The doctrines of 'Ren', 'Li' and 'De' played an indispensable function to 
maintain the imperial dynasty's survival as already noted. 
We need to. mention here that the emperor was usually succeeded by his 
son or another family member, except when hereditary succession was disrupted 
by rebellion or revolution. But as soon as the rebel leader became the new 
emperor, the hereditary system started to work again. This was because the 
combination of patrimonial family structure and Confucian ideology reproduced 
the same political structure. In view of this, it is not difficult to see why the 
Chinese political system lasted more than two thousand years. 
The Chinese traditionally were never able to think of themselves as being 
without an emperor. The Chinese people overwhelmed the last emperor in 1911 
to establish a Republic, but they still maintained the political structure of the 
imperial institution. The paramount leader Chiang Kai-shei had supreme 
dictatorial power, and no one could challenge him. He was like a former 
emperor. The SCCS data reflect this, based on the situation in 1936. 
The other political variables still to be considered reflect the autocratic 
power of the central Executive. First, subordinate officials were typically 
appointed by the supreme executive (51. 7 percent) (Table 5). Second, the 
principle subordinate functionaries were heads of territorial divisions of the state 
who were closely supervised by the supreme executive and formed part of a 
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centralized administrative system (50 percent) (Table 6). Third, in a plurality of 
agrarian societies (46. 7 percent) the supreme executive appointed judicial 
authority which was then relatively independent of the executive (Table 7). On 
all of these dimensions, China was found to be in the modal categories. The long 
tradition of centralization with supreme executive power exercised by the emperor 
determined the Chinese political system and was also typical of other agrarian 
societies. 
Table 5. Selection of Subordinate Officials 
Value Label 
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*supreme appointment 
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Table 6. Administrative Hierarchy 
Value Label 
absence effective sovereignty 
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Table 7. Judiciary 
Value Label 
lack judicial authority 
very limit judicial authority 
executive as judicial power 
*relatively independent 
Valid Cases 


















Only on the political organizational characteristic of Advisory Bodies was 
China found to be non-modal (See table 8). In fact, this variable reflects the 
situation in which the supreme executive surrounded himself with advisors who 
were family members. 
Table 8. Advisory Bodies 
Value Label 
absence effective sovereignty 
absence separate consultative 
kin group 
personal favorite of executive 
advisory body 


















TOTAl 30 100.0 
Valid Cases 29 Missing Cases 1 
(*China is in·this category) 
By describing, explaining, and comparing the data of the thirty agrarian 
societies, we have verified that the political structure of pre-revolutionary China 
fits the agrarian pattern very well. 
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L Additional characteristics of political structure and process in Imperial 
China 
Weber distinguished three types of authority (1947): 
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1) Rational legal authority--resting on a belief in the 'legality' of patterns 
of nonnative rules and the rights of those elevated to authority; 
2) Traditional authority--resting on an established belief in the sanctity of 
inunemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising 
authority; 
3) Charismatic authority--resting on devotion to the specific and 
exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual 
person, and of the nonnative patterns or order revealed or ordained by 
him. 
In the case of rational-legal authority, obedience is owed to the legally 
established impersonal order. It extends to the persons exercising the authority 
of their office. In the case of traditional authority, obedience is owed to the 
person or the chief who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority 
and who is ( within its sphere) bound by tradition. But here the obligation of 
obedience is not based on the impersonal order, but is a matter of personal 
loyalty within the area of accustomed obligations. In the case of charismatic 
authority, it is the charismatically qualified leader as such who is obeyed by virtue 
of personal trust in him and his revelation, his heroism or his exemplary qualities 
so far as they fall within the scope of the individual's belief in his charisma 
(Weber 1947). 
Traditional authority was perhaps the most prevalent type in agrarian 
societies in general and in China in particular. The patriarchal family and its 
extension as a model of state organization exemplified this. Patriarchalism is a 
system where authority is usually organized on both an economic and a kinship 
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basis, as a household. Authority is exercised by a particular individual who is 
designated by a definite rule of inheritance. 
While primarily reflecting traditional authority, China's polity showed 
characteristics of charismatic authority. Weber describes charisma as "a certain 
quality of an individual personality by virtue of which is set apart from ordinary 
men and treated as endowed with superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional 
qualities" (1947, p. 329). It is essential that the charismatic individual be 
recognized or regarded as such. This recognition is a matter of complete 
personal devotion arising out of enthusiasm, or of despair and hope" (Eisenstadt 
1968, p. xviii). The idea of the 'Son of Heaven' exemplified this. As a matter of 
fact, the political structure and process in China had always depended on the 
leadership of the 'Son of Heaven', who embraced both traditional and charismatic 
authority. Rational-legal authority was non-existent. 
The institution of a supreme emperor began with unification in 211 BC., 
when the state of Qin conquered its neighbors and set the stage for the Han 
dynasty during which Confucianism became a state doctrine or dominant ideology. 
The emperor's absolute authority placed him in a unique position. To the 
Chinese people, the worship of Tian (heaven) as the supreme power was 
restricted to the sovereign alone. His position was confirmed as the authorized 
or legitimated leader of mankind, and he acted as their representative or 
intermediary in neiotiating with the supreme being. Tian-Zi meaning 'Son of 
Heaven' exercised a profound effect on the Chinese concept of sovereignty. 
Confucianism, as a secular religion enhanced the position of emperor and 
sanctified his sovereignty. In China, the throne of emperor was surrounded with 
rituals which brought the mystical Tian near to the secular earth. The emperor 
usually wrote in red and his officials wrote in black. In an audience, he alone 
faced south, while they faced north. Only the emperor could use the special term 
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Zhen , meaning I. The characters of his personal name were taboo throughout the 
whole country, and- any reference to the emperor or the imperial will was always 
separated from, and elevated above, the rest of the lines of any document in 
which it appeared. hnperial edicts were received with incense and ritual 
prostration, and temples were built for the worship of His Majesty. All subjects 
performed the traditional Kowtow (Ke Tou) and cheered 'Long live, long long live 
the emperor' (WanSui WanWanSui) in the emperor's presence (This situation is 
repeated in the Cultural Revolution in contemporary China). 
Ideally, the sovereign emperor was pictured as a holy or saintly ruler, who 
had been provided by heaven (Tian) so as to appear at the appropriate moment 
on earth. The connectio? between earthly government and the ordinances of 
Heaven was taken further with the assumption that the 'Son of Heaven' was 
responsible to Heaven for the welfare of his earthly charges. As 'Son of Heaven', 
he maintained the universal harmony of man and nature by doing the right things 
at right time according to the Mandate of Heaven (Ren, Li and De of 
Confucianism). No one could challenge his power or question the morality of his 
action. 
How did the emperor rule his realm? As 'Son of Heaven', the emperor 
was placed at the highest position of a power pyramid. Beneath him there was 
a huge hierarchy with a pyramidal structure to rule the government and the 
people (See chart 3). From the chart, we can see that the imperial emperor 
stood at the apex of the pyramidal power structure. The literati, royal family, in-
law family of the emperor (WaiQi), and the eunuchs comprised the state 
bureaucracy. 
The political structure of the Han dynasty (B.C. 206--A.D. 202) illustrated 
the supreme power of the emperor and the function of literati, WaiQi, and the 
eunuchs. Its political patterns showed was similar to Rome's 'Authoritarian 
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bureaucracy' described previously. 
First, the political authority in the state was completely centralized in the 
sovereignty of the emperor. Second, the emperor's authority in the conduct of 
the administration was exercised in his behalf by his chief ministers. They stood 
at the top of a graded bureaucracy and were responsible to him for the success 
or failure of the administration. Third, this bureaucracy was centralized in the 
vast palace at the capital (e.g., the Forbidden City in Beijing) where the emperor 
exercised the power of appointment to office. His chief task became the selection 
of civil servants (who came from the literati or the royal family), with an eye to 
the maintenance of his power and his dynasty. 
Among the three political factions (literati, patriarchal and in-law families 
of the emperor, and eunuchs), the literati were the most important part of the 
political structnre. The Emperor actnall y realized his rule depending on the 
literati who shared. knowledge and a common ethics--Confucianism--which gave 
the members of this faction a strong sense of solidarity (Pye 1978). 
The Chinese literati were a statns group who had proven themselves in a 
series of competitive examinations which tested their scholarship and the depth 
of their knowledge of the Confucian tradition. They played an indispensable 
social function in the bureaucracy. Although numerically infinitesimal, the literati 
were extremely powerful by reason of their unity and closeness to the emperor. 
They owned the largest amount of land. This class possessed every privilege, the 
highest being the privilege of reproducing itself, which was the monopoly of 
Confucian education (Balazs 1964). The literati elite drew its strength from the 
indispensable function it performed--the coordination and supervisors of the 
productive labor of others. This made the whole social organism work. All 
mediating and administrative functions were carried out by the literati. 
Most of the· Chinese people accepted the literati as their 'father-mother' 
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officials (Fumu Guan). This was because the people were deeply influenced by 
traditional Confucianism. A passage from Mencius (the most influential 
Confucian after Confucius himself) who gave popular form to Confucian thought, 
will give a much better idea about the literati: 
"Great men have their business, and little men have their 
business .... Some labor with their minds, and some labor with their 
strength. Those who labor with their minds govern others; those 
who labor with their strength are governed by others. Those who 
are governed by others support them; those who govern others are 
supported by them" (See Balazs, p. 62, cited from Mencius m A, 
4; trans. James Legge, Chinese Classics 2, 249-50). 
Continuity of government was a necessity if the cohesion of a vast agrarian 
empire was to be maintained. This explains why the ruling class was able to cling 
so tenaciously to their prerogatives and last for such an astonishing length of 
time. Without strict fulfillment of the coordinating function by the literati and 
its united political philosophy--Confucianism, China would quickly have 
disintegrated (Balazs 1964). 
It is important to point out that China adopted the Confucianism doctrine 
as the dominant ideology, which was enhanced and promulgated by the literati. 
It helped China to create a patriarchal, paternalistic world in which gradations of 
rank, from the sovereign downward, were marked by the reciprocal relations of 
favor and obligation. Individual rights, initiative, and liberty were entirely lacking. 
Under the guidance of the state hegemony of Confucianism, all literati in the 
central and local government performed their duty based on 'loyalty to the 
emperor and taking care of the people according to Ren, Li, De'. The literati as 
an elite group were contingent on the persistence of the ideal of a unified 
Empire. Of course, this situation helped the emperor to maintain the united 
bureaucracy and his sovereign authority. 
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There are two other important political groups, besides the literati in the 
imperial era. One consisted of the members of the patriarchal and in-law 
families of the emperor. As mentioned before, the 'Son of Heaven' ruled the 
whole country, which was just like a extended patriarchal family. So we can 
imagine the function of the patriarchal family and in-law family in court politics. 
Since the throne of the emperor usually devolved to the oldest son, the emperor 
usually favored his in-laws for appointment as high officials of court politics so 
as to avoid power struggles for the succession within his patriarchal family. This 
was because the in-law family (WaiQi) or maternal relatives were the one group 
of persons completely dependent upon the emperor's favor as well as tied to him 
by marriage bonds (Fairbank 1986). 
Meanwhile, the emperor kept a number of eunuchs who were devoted 
exclusively to serve the person of the emperor. It was their day-to-day 
relationship with the emperor that helped them become another political interest 
group. Within the palace there were many eunuchs (e.g. by the end of the Ming 
dynasty, there were seventy thousand eunuchs in the Forbidden City; during Qing 
dynasty the number exceeded one hundred thousand) who served for the 
emperor's lifetime. In theory, the eunuchs had no role in the management of 
government or the making any of public policy, however the emperor came to 
rely on them more and more. 
The emperor usually depended on eunuchs and relatives to supervise and 
counter the power of the literati. The emperor always used these two groups to 
supervise and control a large number of literati in the central and local 
bureaucracy. In the short term the supervisory function of in-law family and 
eunuchs was an effective way to promote the whole organism to work well. 
However, in the long term, it weakened and undermined the regular bureaucracy, 
since the strong contradiction between well-educated literati, who depended on 
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their own ability and knowledge of Confucianism, and in-law family members and 
eunuchs, who were only personal favorites of the emperor, could not be avoided. 
It often happened that in-law family members and eunuchs meddled in court 
politics. This always had chaotic consequences, a situation that is repeatedly 
verified by Chinese history. That is why the first emperor of each dynasty usually 
strictly controlled the number of eunuchs and forbade the appointment of in-law 
family members as high officials in the inner court. But it was impossible for 
subsequent emperors to avoid using many in-law family members and large 
numbers of eunuchs. A new dynasty reproduced or copied the same political 
structure of the former dynasty. History was repeated with surprising similarity. 
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Summary 
My aim in discussing the political structure and process in imperial China 
and comparing it with other agrarian societies is to establish a basis for 
understanding the persistence of patrimonial politics and the cult of the supreme 
leader in modem China. It is obvious that no one can conjure away the sheer 
length of time the Chinese Empire lasted, or deny the permanence of the 
imperial institutions, which endured in spite of successive metamoiphosis. The 
Chinese people overthrew the last emperor in 1911 and Mao Zedong brought 
dramatic revolution to China after 1949, but post-revolutionary China is still 
reacting to the legacies of imperial polity. Following the theory of Lenski et al. 
(1991) a reason for this can be suggested in the fact that although modem China 
has entered the industrial era, its polity still operates on an agrarian model. As 
in other industrializing agrarian societies, China's leaders today are restricted to 
forms of government and ideological discourse that were established in the 
agrarian era. 
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Part Il Post-Revolutionary China 
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Chapter 3 Maoism as an Ideology 
The twentieth century has witnessed the passing away of traditional 
Chinese imperial political structure. Revolutionary elites appeared with a new 
totalistic ideology--Marxist-Leninism and Maoism and established the People's 
Republic of China. The country entered the industrial era. But as an 
industrializing agrarian society, according to Lenski et al., China is a mixture of 
the old and the new. Preindustrial technology is still widespread in agriculture. 
In 1949, for example, there were only 401 tractors in the whole country and all 
of these were imported. In 1958 the figure was 45,330 and in 1966 it stood at 
over 200,000 with more than 2,200 state tractor stations. However, in spite of this 
spectacular rise, in 1962 less than 10 percent of China's ploughland was being 
worked by mechanical methods (Tregear 1980). Other evidence of industrializing 
influences occurring in agricultural production can be seen in the growth in 
powered irrigation and the use of artificial fertilizer (Table 9). 
In 1949, the country still had a basically agrarian population distribution 
with nearly 90 percent of the people living in rural areas, and preindustrial 
agriculture predominated. The growth of mechanized agriculture in the decades 
since the Chinese Revolution has steadily reduced the proportion of the rural 
population compared to the urban (Table 10). But not until 1989 did a majority 
of the Chinese people live in urban centers, and still China has a long way to go 
to reach the advanced industrial pattern where only a tiny minority live in the 
rural areas and are employed in agriculture. 
Table 9. Post-Revolutionary China: The Subsistence Technology and Rural Economic Indicators, 19S2-1980 
1952 1957 1965 
Tractors ( excluding 
small tractors) 
(1,000) 1 1 7 
Powered irrigation 
(mill.hp) 0.1 0.6 9 
Artificial fertilizer 
used per mu 
Gin) 0.1 0.4 3 
Artificial fertilizer 
(mill.tons) 0.2 2 
Note: jin = roughly 0.5 kg. 
* 1957-1980 



















Table 10. China's Urban and Rural Population, 1949-1989 
Urban Rural 
Pop. % of Pop. % of 
(mill.) Total (mill.) Total 
1949 57.45 10.6 48.40 89.4 
1958 107.21 16.3 552.73 83.7 
1966 133.13 17.9 612.29 82.1 
1976 163.41 17.4 773.76 82.6 
1978 172.45 17.9 790.14 82.l 
1981 201.71 20.2 799.01 79.2 
1983 241.50 23.5 786.14 76.5 
1985 384.46 36.6 665.98 63.4 
1987 503.62 46.6 577.11 53.4 
1989 579.72 51.7 540.77 48.3 
Source from Jonathan D. Spence's "The Search For Modem China", Christopher J. Smith's "China: people and places in the land of 
one billion" and Encyclopedic Britannica 1991. 
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According to Lenski's ecological-evolutionary theory (1991), we should not 
expect the Chinese polity to achieve the rational-legal fonns that characterize the 
·polities of the advanced industrial societies while the technological base remains 
largely agrarian. In following discussions, I will argue how the political structures 
and ideology of China still follow the old agrarian pattern . 
.L. Maoism as a hegemonic ideology 
According to Huntington, when traditional political institutions are 
smashed by revolution, the post-revolutionary order depends on the emergence 
of one strong political party (1968). The Chinese Communist Party·under Mao 
was just that kind of party. Instead of a drive toward pluralism and a system of 
legitimacy anchored in the realities of political processes, there was a frantic 
search for a new totalistic ideology to replace the outdated and eroding 
Confucian order. Marxist-Leninism in its Maoist form became that new moral 
order which reenergized the elite's claims to moral superiority and invincibility. 
The party as a new form of political organization assumed the role which the 
literati and other traditional elites played in the agrarian polity. Social stability 
depended direct! y on the strength of the Party and the Party's strength like that 
of the literati of old depended on its unifying ideology. To keep the society in 
harmony and order, the Party used Maoism as its dominant ideology, just as 
Confucianism had played a similar function in pre-revolutionary China. 
Hegemony is an important concept that comes from Gramsci's (1971) 
prison noteboo~. Gramsci always emphasized that it was very critical for the 
process of socialist transition to create a strong ideology. Although the Chinese 
Communist Party has not adopted Gramsci's theory as its guiding thought (they 
considered Gramsci's thought to be anti-Marxist), Chinese ideology is 
nevertheless similar to Gramsci's hegemony. 
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The ruling class use their control of education, culture, communications 
media, etc. to propagate hegemony in social life according to their interests. 
Hegemony has created "a certain way of life and thought that is dominant, in 
which one concept of reality is diffused through society in all its institutional and 
private manifestations"' (Sallach 1974, p. 41). Ideological hegemony becomes the 
main vehicle to realize social control by the ruling class. This is clearly 
exemplified by Maoism. 
Mao applied the principles of Marxist-Leninism to the Chinese situation, 
especially the 'successful experience' of the October Revolution of the former 
Soviet Union. Then he generalized a set of theories and thought adapted for the 
Chinese situation to guide the Chinese revolution. Through a combination of the 
'universal principle of Marxist-Leninism' with Chinese practice, Maoism was 
created. The Chinese Communist Party under the direction of Mao Zedong 
formed one of the largest ideological institutions of the modem world. 
Mao Zedong once told American journalist Edward Snow if there were no 
God in China, one would have to be created. Mao understood the Chinese 
traditional culture very well, especially the political consciousness of people who 
needed a god-like emperor. Mao like other agrarian leaders did not want to 
promote the development of democratic politics or to reform the imperial 
political consciousness of ,the old society. On the contrary, he took advantage of 
people's old political consciousness: Mao became the new emperor. 
(1) The centrality of 'class struggle' in Mao's ideology 
The central concept of Maoism is the notion of 'class struggle'. This 
doctrine was deployed in Chinese society to control all economic and political 
fields and social life until 1978. It reached its peak in the 'disaster' of the 
'Cultural Revolution'. Mao insisted 'never forget class struggle'. He believed if 
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the Party forced confrontations with sources of social resentment and discontent 
even peasants could become 'conscious' and mobilized to the revolutionary 
course. His idea was to keep society in a continual state of revolution. 
The Chinese Party under Mao not only used all its ideological institutions 
to propagate hegemony, but it also launched a number of mass movements to 
continue the revolution. Under the directive of 'class struggle is not over yet', 
they purged many people who disagreed with Mao, including higher leaders and 
lower cadres. Mao let loose cruel struggles within the Party to consolidate his 
hegemony. "In the post-revolutionary period, the continuing series of political 
and economic campaigns express most fully Mao's commitment to 'class struggle'" 
(Solomon 1971, p. 256). 
Here, I give an example how the Party used educational institutions to 
influence the Chinese people. When I was a primary school student, our first 
lesson was that Mao was the greatest liberator. He helped the Chinese people 
to become emancipated from the feudalism, imperialism, and semi-colonialism 
of old China. There was no room for any other ideologies but Maoism. The 
second lesson was "Never forget class struggle" and "We would rather be a 
socialist grass than a capitalist tree", "We would rather have socialist low ratio of 
economic growth than capitalist high rate of growth", "We would rather stop 
production for two years than stop 'class struggle' for one moment". When we 
entered middle school, we had to study more of Mao's works. It was basic 
education to the student in the period of the Cultural Revolution. From the 
beginning, we were completely influenced by Mao's thought. I think both Mao 
and the Party clearly understood Gramsci's words "they (the ruling class) can 
simply create a terrain more favorable to dissemination of certain modes of 
thought, and certain ways of posing and resolving questions involving the entire 
subsequent development of national life" (Gramsci 1971, p. 184). 
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(2) 'Small group' and political education 
Mao depended on many kinds of 'small groups' (xiao zu) and political 
education to realize 'class struggle' . 'Small groups' organize people to study 
Maoism, the documents of the Chinese Communist Party, and the principles of 
Marxist-Leninism. 
From Martin Whyte (1974), we learn the most important of such efforts 
was the formation of the Bao-Jia system. Thus, the 'small group' was actually a 
legacy of imperial China. According to official Qing dynasty (1644-1911) 
documents, throughout the empire inhabitants were organized into groups of ten 
households (termed a bai), ten of these groups were organized into a grouping 
called ajia, and ten of these would in turn form a bao. Each grouping would 
have a head chosen from its families, under the supervision of the Cun (small 
town) magistrate and his assistants (Whyte 1974). The primary purpose of the 
Bao-Jia system was to keep track of the population, control disorder, integrate 
societal unity and consolidate the rule of government. 
paralleled the 'small group' of post-revolutionary China, 
The Bao-Jia system 
both in augmenting 
formal organizational structures with semi-official groupings of ordinary citizens 
and in assigning collective responsibility for reporting deviance to higher 
authorities. 
The many kinds of 'small groups' and neighborhood committees found in 
every urban and rural residential register births and deaths, organize political 
study meetings for imbuing the Communist Party's ideology, and mediate family 
disputes. To some extent, therefore, the 'small group' was patterned after the 
imperial Bao-Jia system. But the post-revolutionary bureaucracy under Mao 
extended much further down into society and was able to maintain closer 
supervision over basic level groups. 'Small groups' were organized primarily on 
the basis of units of work or study, although there were also residential groups. 
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The systematic ideological study and mutual group criticism of political education 
' ' 
made up the central topic of the 'small groups'. Chinese Communist 'small 
group' ritual harkens back to more general practices, inclinations, and 
philosophical themes of traditional China (Whyte 1974). 
The 'small group' aimed at political indoctrination. The formal hierarchy 
of political indoctrination included: the Party Central Committee and propaganda 
department at the top, study committees at territorial and organizational levels 
down to the individual unit, and 'small groups' divided into different grades under 
the local study committee. Everyone in the country was involved in these 'small 
groups' to accept political education. The content of the indoctrination consisted 
in Mao's books and speeches, Party Central Committee's documents, and Marxist-
Leninist orthodoxy. Political study was divided into distinct stages: individual 
study, mutual-help 'small group' meetings, 'small group' discussions, mutual 
criticism, large meetings, and summations (Whyte 1974). This situation, by and 
large, still exits in contemporary China. 
Maoism could be seen as the dominant ideology which played the same 
function as Confucianism in imperial China. In traditional China the unity of 
society was preserved by subjecting the potential governing elite to a long course 
of study of orthodox philosophical texts--Confucianism. Unified in outlook by this 
rigid indoctrination, the elite could then give unity to the state bureaucracy and 
the entire society. A similar practice exits in post-revolutionary China, although 
the nature of both the texts and the elite has changed (Whyte 1974). 
In conclusion, 'small group' ritual is highly routinized, performing a 
maintenance function throughout the whole society. It contributes to preventing 
deviance and maintaining social control. So, we would say, the Chinese 
Communist Party seems to be more successful in getting people to 'drop' old 
habits and to· undertake new tasks through the ritual of political education than 
43 
they are in maintaining change (Whyte 1974). Finally, 'small group' ritual plays 
an important function of effective communications, of getting official ideas, 
especially Mao's ideas, down to ordinary citizens. 
2. Political ritual during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) 
As a charismatic leader of the Chinese Party and people, Mao had 
sovereign authority. In effect, he created himself to become a new emperor. 
According to Durkheim (1965), the experience of religion and the idea of the 
divine are the products of collective activity. Religious belief and social ritual 
enhance the solidarity of the collective or group on which people depend. In 
other words, there . exists a reciprocal relationship between religion and society. 
Religious belief symbolically expresses social reality (Durkheim 1965). Social 
ritual makes use of common emotions and interests to bind people together in 
the collective activity and to strengthen the moral order. Thus, social ritual is a 
primary mechanism for promoting integration and unity in society. 
Why does social ritual produce a mystical energy to bind individuals 
together and make people forget their private interests for the sake of the 
collectivity? Where does the mystical energy come from? When individuals 
come together in social rituals, they focus their attention and behavior on 
common symbols. 
powerful emotional 
As a result of their interaction and inter-stimulation, a 
energy is produced. Each individual feels about him others 
who share the common experience. This causes the emotional energy to be 
reinforced. The conduct of each person promotes a common experience that 
transcends the individual participants. This effect is very important to social life 
and society, because the emotions of the collective group cause their members to 
unite and it strengthens their social bonds. The spatial and temporal 
concentration of the participants during social ritual acts as an exceptionally 
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powerful stimulus. Thus, Durkheim said: "When they (individuals) are once come 
together, a sort of electricity is formed by their collecting which quickly transports 
them to an extraordinary degree of exaltation. Every sentiment expressed finds 
a place without resistance in all the minds, which are very open to outside 
impressions; each echoes the others, and is re-echoed by the others. The initial 
impulse thus proceeds, growing as it goes, as an avalanche grows in its advance" 
(Durkheim 1965, p. 247). In this collective ambience, each person experiences 
a supernatural strength which makes all feel inseparable. 
When we use Durkheim's ideas about religious belief and ritual to 
understand modern society, we can see that what goes on in social ritual can play 
an important role to bind individuals together for political purposes. Using 
Durkheim we can understand why Mao used 'political ritual' to promote political 
ideology and the legitimacy of his regime. The political deification of Mao 
Zedong succeeded in binding the Chinese people together and created an intense 
collective awareness during the Cultural Revolution. 
When the Chinese Communist Party established the People's Republic of 
China in 1949, Confucianism and other kinds of religious belief such as Buddhism 
and Taoism were abolished and replaced by Marxist doctrine which declared 
'religion is the opiate of the people'. All traditional religious ritual was 
discontinued. The only dominant ideology of post-revolutionary China was 
Maoism, which combined Marxism-Leninism with concrete conditions in China. 
But according to Durkheim, rituals are a system of rites that every society uses 
as an adhesive to hold itself together. Rituals must exist even in secular societies. 
Although the Chinese Party eliminated Confucianism and other religious belief, 
they initiated and encouraged a new form of social ritual activity centered around 
Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Party, so as to realize the common goal of 
'utopian socialism' during the Cultural Revolution. 
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In the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Mao was seen as the 'Great 
Leader', 'Great Helmsman', and 'Great Liberator' and was widely worshipped by 
the people. Each person took part in 'small group' rituals to accept political 
education and to understand Maoist doctrines. Maoism became the new 
orthodoxy. The political rituals which deified Mao penetrated the whole society. 
At that time, there were many slogans such as 'Long live Chairman Mao' and 
'Be ready to die in defense of Chairman Mao' displayed everywhere. There were 
many songs which children sang reminiscent of Western hymns in praise of Jesus. 
The content proclaimed: 'My love for my parents is great but greater still is my 
love for Chairman Mao', or 'We think of you every minute, respected Chairman 
Mao'. The cult of personality, which the 'small group' pushed to the extreme, 
derived implicit support from the previous long history of emperor worship. 
Loyalty toward the leader rested on the traditional concept of loyalty to one's 
superiors in all political and social ranks. The injunction, 'every directive issued 
by Chairman Mao must be obeyed whether you understand it or not, agree with 
it or not', drew on the traditional Confucian virtue of obedience. 
Meanwhile, Mao was glorified as 'The Red Sun', 'The Great Teacher', 
'The Great Commander', 'The Great Steersman' and 'The Messiah of Working 
People'. Mao became a symbol of the divine, the source of supernatural energy. 
Catching a glimpse of him in public left observers with unforgettable memories, 
and many were reduced to tears by the experience. A kind of supernatural 
energy was produced by collective ritual activities. The individuals and masses 
would spend the night in the street if they knew Mao's route the next day would 
take him past them. When Mao finally appeared, the people would jump, shout, 
cry out and shake the 'Little Red Book' of Mao in paroxysms of joy. Because 
individuals, who had obeyed Mao as their god and who for this reason believed 
that Mao was with them, approached the world with confidence and with a 
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feeling of increased energy. A collective will to worship Mao penetrated each 
person and became an integral part of the Chinese people. 
Mao's appearances verify what Durkheim said about the particular attitude 
of a man speaking _to a crowd. If he has succeeded in entering into communion 
with the crowd, his· language has a grandiloquence that would be ridiculous in 
ordinary circumstances; his gestures show a certain domination; his very thought 
is impatient of all rules, and easily falls into all sorts of excesses (Durkheim 1965, 
p. 241). Mao's enormous presence was something very real; it came to him from 
the masses which he always addressed. The sentiments provoked by his words 
(Mao's Little Red Book) came back to him, but enlarged and amplified, and to 
this degree the masses of society strengthened his own sentiment. Under this 
circumstance, Mao became a leader of confidence, courage and boldness of 
action, just like the believer who thinks that he feels the regard of his god turned 
graciously toward him (Durkheim 1965, p. 242). Like the emperors of old, Mao 
became an omnipotent, god-like figure whom no one could challenge. 
Political ritual activities of deification were set up in association with the 
fanatic devotion to the idol Mao. For instance, it was very common that, in the 
morning before breakfast, family members stood before Mao's picture asking for 
instructions for the day. In the evening, standing before Mao's picture again, they 
made a quiet confession of the 'sins' they had committed during the day. People 
worshiped Mao as a routine activity--often before working, before class, before 
a meeting, or before dinner. They would all stand up, facing Mao's picture, and 
say 'we wish longevity to our Great Leader, the Reddest Sun in our heart, 
Chairman Mao'. When a formal meeting or a conference was held, two songs in 
praise of Mao were added at the beginning and the end of the meeting 'The East 
is Red' and 'Sailing in the Sea Relies on the Helmsman'. Here I quote a few 
lines from these songs. 
'Red is the east, rises the sun. 
China has brought forth a Mao Ze-dong. 
For the people's happiness he works 
He is the people's liberator'. 
* * * * * 
'Sailing the seas depends on the Hehnsman 
Life and growth depend on the sun. 
Rain and dewdrops nourish the crops, 
Making revolution depends on Mao Ze-dong's thought, 
Mao's thought is the sun that forever shines'. 
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These two songs were considered as sacred as the Chinese national 
anthem. The masses were also expected to learn and practice a special dance of 
loyalty to Mao. While performing the loyalty dance people used to hold the 
'Little Red Book' on their chest. Meanwhile they sang a song such as 'The East 
is Red' as they danced. Thus Mao was worshiped continually through verbal 
expression, singing and dancing. These ritual activities expressed the idea that 
Mao had saved the Chinese people from the miserable 'old society'. He was the 
great liberator of the people and he would lead them on the right path. Thus the 
collective values were dramatized and reinforced (Wuthnow 1987), and social 
cohesion was promoted. 
In the midst of this effervescent social environment and out of this 
effervescence itself Maoism as religious belief penetrated the whole society. The 
social rituals to "which society is strongly enough attached to impose them upon 
its members, are, by that very fact, marked with a distinctive sign provocative of 
respect" (Durkheim 1965, p. 238). Mao's works were 'holy writ': one sentence 
spoken by him was as potent as ten thousand ordinary sentences, and his writing 
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was printed in the 'Precious Red Book'. In order to make them more accessible 
and convenient for a person to carry, some of his quotations were collected in the 
'Little Red Book' and handed out to each individual (Jiping Zuo 1991), just like 
the Bible comes in many forms and sizes to facilitate its wide use in a Christian 
country. People could memorize each sentence of the 'Red Book' by heart and 
use Mao's words to solve daily problems. People often met together to study 
Mao's works as Christians read the Bible. 
Moreover, during that period, whenever a new 'highest instruction' from 
Mao was announced, people would go into the streets and celebrate at the very 
moment the new instruction was released, even if it was midnight, holding the 
'Red Book' high in their hands. The supernatural, mystical strength of Mao made 
individuals forget their own interests, they made themselves his devotees. 
When Durkheim used the concept of 'symbol' to explain the elementary 
belief of the Australian societies, he said: "In fact, it is a well-known law that the 
sentiments aroused in us by something spontaneously attach themselves to the 
symbol which represents them" (Durkheim 1965, p. 251). In the Cultural 
Revolution, red, for the Chinese people, was a sign of loyalty to Mao. It also 
suggested love. This transference of sentiments comes simply from the fact that 
the idea of Mao and the symbols of Mao were closely united in individuals' 
minds. The result was that the emotions provoked by the one · extended 
contagiously to the other. During that period, the relationship between Mao and 
the masses was seen as that of the sun and sunflowers. Like sunflowers turning 
toward the sun, the hearts of people turned toward Mao. The Chinese people 
were unable to think of themselves being without Chairman Mao during the 
Cultural Revolution, just as the agrarian Chinese state was unthinkable without 
the Emperor to guide it. 
All of the places where Mao had ever stayed, such as SaoSan in which he 
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was born, Tiananmen Gate, etc., were seen as 'holyplaces' and they often evoked 




Mao and the Party's lea?ers successfully employed rituals to achieve 
political cohesion. Chinese society showed cohesion and unity at least until Mao 
died in 1976, even though Mao's aura covered up .a lot of instability and inner 
tensions. 
If we compare Maoist political ritual activities to the imperial Chinese 
polity, we observe that Maoism was like a new Confucianism. The orthodox 
position on Mao's thought served as a justification for the status quo in the 
Chinese Communist system. Since Mao's doctrines were treated religiously, they 
legitimated his regime and prevented any changes either on the theoretical level 
or in practice (Zuo Jiping 1991). 
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Chapter 4 Political Structure in Modem China 
Chinese agrarian society based on subsistence level production and the 
ideology of Confucianism formulated a hierarchical structuring of society with 
traditional and charismatic authority; a collectivist organization at the village and 
neighborhood level with individuals made subservient to the large group; and a 
tightly knit social network, with a strong emphasis on the extended family. In this 
chapter, I exhibit the particularistic ties of patronage, nepotism, and favoritism 
that have persisted in contemporary China. 
Huntington · (1968) considers that the party, as a new form of political 
organization after the revolution, takes over traditional elites and social stability 
depends directly on the strength of the party. He proposes a one dominant party 
model. In a dominant ·party system only one party has capacity to govern the 
whole society. The processes determining governmental policy and political 
leadership function almost exclusively through the framework of a single party. 
The party becomes the source of legitimacy and since the party is the institutional 
embodiment of national sovereignty, it becomes the popular will. The dominant 
party decides the paramount position of political leaders and their fortunes as 
representatives of the people's interest. Under these circumstances, one might 
infer that the party bureaucracy should be highly efficient in implementing its 
policies. 
The political structure of post-revolutionary China was based on just such 
a dominant party system--the Chinese Communist Party. But its political system 
and bureaucracy are nevertheless very inefficient. So the Chinese case does not 
fall into Huntington's model of a dominant party system. Lenski's ecological-
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evolutionary theory better explains China's difficulty converting traditional and 
charismatic authority to rational-legal authority. 
Lenski et al. argue that in industrializing agrarian societies, one of the 
greatest hindrances to development has been the kind of governing class they 
inherited form the past (1991). The legacies of imperial political structure and 
process still have a strong influence on the Chinese Communist government. 
When we look at China, it seems like Confucianism is reborn in Mao's dominant 
ideology along with features of the agrarian polity such as patrimonialism, 
nepotism and favoritism. These legacies caused China's single party system to 
have inefficiencies not explained by Huntington's model. 
L Historical factors in the development of patronage. nepotism. and 
favoritism 
The most egregious mistake made by many was the belief that legalism, 
which had played an important role during the first dynasty, was compatible with 
Confucianism. Confucianism, with its emphasis on personal relationships, kinship 
and fealty to elders, masters, and emperor, unconditionally became the 
hegemonic ideology of the ruling class, and the concept of the role of law was 
very far from the -consciousness of the Chinese leaders, officials, and masses. 
Although China advocates the establishment of a rationalized legal system today, 
Stavis states that: "It would be the most radical break in China's three thousands 
years of political tradition to have the top leadership legitimize its power in laws 
and popularly elected institutions" (Stavis 1983, pp. 189-91). 
Since the Han Dynasty, Confucianism with its emphasis on personal 
relationships and blood-ties overshadowed the rule of law. In fact, it was 
impossible to avoid informal patron-client relations, nepotism and favoritism. 
This is because in China all individuals belonged to a network of particularistic 
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relationships, some in which an individual was dominant, and some in which he 
was subservient. 
2. Patronage (patron-client relations) in post-revolutionary China 
China was in chaos after the May Fourth Movement overthrew the last 
emperor of Chinese history. Who could rule the huge country and its people? 
After more than thirty years of war, including anti-Japanese struggles coupled 
with a long and terrible domestic war against Chiang Kai-si and the 
Kuangmingdang, the Chinese Communist Party established the Peoples Republic 
of China (P.R.C.) in 1949. The Party offered many kinds of privileges in politics, 
economy and social life. Thus, another form of patrimonialism (patronage), 
nepotism and favoritism appeared in China; and although the emperor no longer 
existed, the features of the old order were still at work. 
According to Weber, in an organization based on rational-legal authority, 
political leaders should act in obedience to the regulations of law and order. But 
in China, because there is no institutionalization of rational-legal bureaucracy, the 
Chinese political leaders have to set up many alliance or special personal 
relationships with each other so as to maintain their power or to fight others for 
personal security. Each high official of the central government has his own 
patron-client network. The practical situation of the Party and the government 
bureaucracy reflects Eisenstadt's statement: "The most important tensions 
inherent in these relations (patron-clients) are those between the emphasis on 
purely solidary or spiritual relations and concrete--power and instrumental--
obligations" (1984, p. 14). 
In China, the Communist Party Chairman such as Mao Ze-dong or Deng 
Xiao-ping as paramount leaders were much like an emperor with the supreme 
decision-making concentrated in their hands. The only difference was that they 
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couldn't appoint their own sons as their direct successors, but they could 
detennine or choose the successor of the Party who came from the ruling clique. 
The basis of power networks in politics is a pattern of personal bonds 
known as GuanXi . GuanXi describes the intense, personal bonds of 
acquaintanceship and mutual belonging that give vivid context to the networks of 
personal associations (Pye 1981). Only through GuanXi, could political leaders 
set up networks for confirming power or enlarging influence so that they could 
hold predominant power. According to Eisenstadt and Roniger, "this is evidence 
of clientelistic networks within state socialist regimes" (1981, p. 234). 
In China political decisions are firmly controlled by the politburo and the 
secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party and by the Standing Committee of 
the State Council, the top Commanders of the military, and the leaders of the 
wealthiest and largest cities and provinces (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1986). In 
Harding's analysis of radical and moderate reform (1986), we can see how patron-
client relationships work among the Chinese political elites. 
Deng Xiaoping is the patron of General Secretary Hu Yao-bang, Zhao 
Zhi-yang, vice premier Wan Li, Tian Ji-yun and Zhu Rong-ji. They were 
reformers who emphasized as their basic program developing a commodity 
economy and decreasing the socialist planned economy while moving toward a 
market economy gradually. Veteran leaders Chun Yun, Peng Zheng, Premier Li 
Peng and Vice premier Yao Yi-lin are represented as moderate reformers who 
place their emphasis on using a 'state economic plan' as guidance for developing 
a national economy. They fought their way to the top through a combination of 
factors: the influence of patrons, Deng Xiaoping and Chun Yun; the 
persuasiveness of their policy recommendations; political skill and knowledge; and 
the networks of personal connections built up over many years (Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg 1986). 
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Because Hu Yaobang had formed a patron-client relationship with Deng 
Xiaoping since the early 1940's, when Deng took over from former Chairman 
Hua Guofeng, he appointed Hu Yaobang to be the General Secretary. Zhao 
Zhiyang was the governor of Sichuan province (Deng's hometown) before he was 
appointed premier in 1981. It was due to the special personal relationship with 
Deng and his loyalty to Deng that he got the chance to enter the highest political 
position. Deng as their patron gave them the opportunity to become the elite 
leaders; meanwhile Deng got his clients' support to confinn his supreme position 
over the whole Party and the government. 
It is through GuanXi that political elites establish reciprocal dependent 
relationships with political allies to protect themselves in political struggles. 
Actually in Chinese politics, names of elites never stand alone, for they are always 
linked, for better or worse, with others. Whenever a new name is added to the 
politburo or the standing committee, everyone speculates about the newcomer's 
personal affiliations, and hence about whose power has brought about this new 
appointment and whether the sponsor was in fact shrewd in sponsoring such an 
individual (Pye 1981). 
\Vhy do Chinese political elites need tQ set up GuanXi ? Traditional 
Chinese culture (Confucianism) emphasized the importance of handling many 
kinds of GuanXi in a huge social web. The main reason, the main motivation, 
is to search for career security and protection of power. "The extraordinary force 
that holds together the networks of officials is the intense attraction of mutual 
dependency in the Chinese culture between superiors and subordinates, each of 
whom needs the other for his own protection and each of whom is vulnerable to 
the other ... " (Pye 1981, p. 7). Under this circumstance,. personal relationship 
strengthens allies and integrates and creates linkage networks that extend upward 
in support of particular leaders as 'patrons' who, in turn, look for 'clients' to 
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ensure their power. Weber's ideal-type of impersonal management does not exist. 
Personal loyalty and informal GuanXi have a dominating presence on the Chinese 
political stage. 
The endless unpredictable political struggles for power within the 
Communist Party became another reason for political elites and officials to search 
for patronage as protection against repeated purges of rivals by the predominant 
leader. More than 30 years of political power struggles has taught people to 
search for patron-clients relationships so as to protect themselves. In the 1950's, 
the Great Leap Forward and "Hundred Flowers Bloom, A Hundred Schools 
Contend" campaign caused a number of higher leaders, including Marshal Peng 
Dehai, to lose office and to be put into jail. In the 1960's, National leaders Liu 
Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were purged by Mao Zedong in the Cultural 
Revolution. Thousands of officials were forced into study groups of Maoist 
thought or sent to the countryside to accept re-education. In the 1970's the Lin 
Biao rebellion caused another purging campaign. Mao allowed Deng to 
reappear, but Deng was purged again in early 1976. In similar fashion, Deng 
Xiaoping, Chen Yun and other political elites launched many campaigns after 
Mao's death: a period of criticism of 'bourgeois liberalism' in 1980-1981; a 
campaign against 'spiritual pollution' in the ideological and cultural sphere in 
1983-1984; and a crackdown against corruption in 1985-1986 (see chapter 7). 
From these unpredictable political movements, we can see that the rule 
of law has meant little in modem China. In the face of many political upheavals, 
higher leaders, officials and masses became victims of political struggles and many 
people, including officials at all levels, were left to wonder what the highest 
leader; such as Mao, Deng and the Party apparatus wanted. The non-
institutionalized Chinese bureaucracy did not ensure a stable power position and 
personal security in these political struggles. Those who wanted to pursue 
57 
protection of their power or keep their higher social status and win promotion or 
maintain personal security, had to seek as their patrons those most powerful 
leaders, who in turn wove webs of personal dependence with their clients. 
According to Lieberthal and Oksenberg, bonds of GuanXi arise from 
family connections, common geographical origin, shared experience (school or 
military service ties), or shared loyalty toward the same patron or commander 
(such as Zhou Enlai or Deng Xiaoping) (1988). When Hu Yao-bang was 
General Secretary from 1981 to 1987,people who associated with the Communist 
Youth League in the 1950' s which Hu headed were able to rise to good positions 
rapidly; and people who were trained in Moscow in 1950's, where Li Peng was 
active, were winning positions at many levels when Li became Premier. From 
this, we can clearly see how important patron-clients relations are. 
1,_ Taizidang in China 
Under Confucianism kinship relations were extremely important in the 
agrarian polity and they have retained this importance in modern China. The 
term Taizidang is used in referring to nepotism in the Chinese bureaucracy. 
Taizidang actually is a general designation for the children of the Chinese high-
levels cadres. But it has a special meaning in politics. It is a group of people 
who, as children of political elites of China (most of them were founders of 
P.R.China), have been promoted to high-level government and Party positions. 
These 'princes' hold the same important political positions as their parents. 
Table 11 shows characteristics of Taizidang members. It is the privileged 
families that can offer their children overseas study (formerly the Communist 
leaders always sent their children to Moscow, but now children of Taizidang are 
sent to the U.S.A.). If we look at 'family background', we find that most of the 
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Taizidang'sparents held important positions, including former National Chairman, 
former Premier, Vice-Premier, Vice-Chairman of Military Committee, Ministers, 
Marshals1 etc. That is to say, most Taizidang members are the descendants of old 
revolutionaries who made great contributions to the Chinese revolution and 
whose sufferings in the Cultural' Revolution are highly appreciated in Chinese 
society. 
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Table 11. Profiles of Select Members of Taiwang 
Name AGE POSITION EDUCATION FAMILY BACKGROUND 
Li Peng 62 PB\CC\Premier University(O) Zhou Enlai, Deng Yinzhao(AS),fonner premier 
Zhou Jiahua 63 PB\CC\vice-Premier University(O\D) Ye Jianying(SL),fonner vice Chairman of the 
Party, former Chairman of military committee 
Ye Xuanping 65 CC\Vice-Chairman University(O\D) Ye Jianying(S), see above (former marshal) 
Peng Shilu 65 Vice-Minister University(O\D) Peng Pai(S), former minister 
Ding Henggao 59 CC\Minister University Nie Rongzhen(SL), former marshal of PLA 
Chen Changyi 56 CC\Provincial secretary University Xi Zongxun(SL), former standing committee member 
Li Changan 56 Minister University Li Fuchun(S), former vice premier 
Li Tieying 54 PBICC\State Councilor University Li Weihan(S), one of oldest revolutionary 
Song Ruixiang 51 Governor University Song Renqiong(S), former standing committee member 
Liao Hui 49 CC\vice-Minister University Liao Chenzhi(S), former minister 
Zhang Boxing ? CC\Provincial secretary Unknown Peng Zheng(SL), former chairman of national committee 
Bu He ? CC\Govemor Unknown Ulanfu(S), former vice chairman of national committee 
Wu Shaozu ? CC\Minister Unknown Wu Yunfu(S), former minister 
Chen Haosu 48 Vice-Minister University Chen Yi(S), former vice premier and marshal 
He Pengfei 46 Major General Unknown He Long(S), former vice premier and marshal 
Chen Yuan 54 Minister University Chen Yun(S), former vice chairman of the Party 
Qiao Zonghuai ? ·CC\Vice Minister Unknown Qiao Guanhua(S), former minister 
Liu Yuan 48 CC\Govemor University Liu Shaoqi(S), former chairman of Chinese government 
Xie Jingping ? Governor Unknown Xi Zhongxun(S), former standing committee member 
Yu Zhengsheng 45 Major Unknown Zhang Aiping(SL), former general of PLA 
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Note: All position are as of November, 1989. (Zhou Jiahua became vice-
premier in 1991). Biographical information is from Zhonggong Renming Lu 
(Taibei: Guoli Zhengzhi daxue, 1983), Wolfgang Barike, who's who in the 
People's Republic of China, 2nd ed. (NY, K.G. Saur 1987. and China Directory 
1990 (Tokyo: Radio Press, Nov. 1989). PB, CC and PLS stand for Politburo and 
Central Committee members and People's Liberal Army; Oand D for attendance 
at universities overseas or domestically; and AS, S and SL for adopted son, son 
and son in law (All information came from "Studies in Comparative 
Communism", Vol 24, No. 1, March 1991, p. 58-76). 
This situation in the P.R.C. is not unique, but has a counterpart. When 
we look into the political high-ranking elites of Taiwan (Republic of China), a 
country which shares the same agrarian legacies of imperial China with the 
People's Republic of China, we find a strong similarity between Taizidang in 
Taiwan and Taizidang in Communist China (See table 12). 
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Table 12: The 13th KMT Central Committee Members with High-ranking Cadre Family Background 
Name Position Family Background 
Chen Li-an Standing committee member Father: Ch'en Ch'en 
minister of economic affair former premier 
Soong Ch'u-yu Standing committee member Father: Soong Ta, 
deputy general of the KMT general of the army 
Lian Chan Standing committee member Father: Lian Chen--g 
minister of foreign affairs president's adviser 
Kuo Wan-lung Standing committee member Husband: Ni Wen-ya, standing 
minister of finance committee member 
Chien Fu Standing committee member Father: Chien She-Iiang,former 
Chairman of committee of Economic Construction president of Academy of Science 
Chien Chun Member of Central Committee, secretary general Father: Chien She-Jiang, 
of Executive Yuan (see above) 
Ma Ying-jeou Member of Central Committee, deputy general of Father: Ma Heh-ling, deputy 
Central Committee director, Control Yuan 
Chiang Hsiao-yen Member of Central Committee, vice-minister of Father: Chiang Ching-kuo, former 
foreign affair president, son of Chiang Kai-shek 
Chiang Hsiao-tsu Member of Central Committee Father: Chiang Ching-Kuo, see above 
Chiang Hsiao-yung Member of Central Committee Father: Chaing Ching-Kuo, see above 
Ting Mao-shih Member of Central Committee Father-in-law: Huang Chieh, former 
general of army 
Wang Hsiao-Ian Member of Central Committee Father: Wang Tih-wu, former standing 
committee member 
Yu Fan-ying Member of Central Committee Father: Ku Cheng-kang, former standing 
committee member 
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Source: These data are from various issues of Hsin-hsin-wen (New News 
Weekly) (TaiPei) (See "Transformation and Change in Mainland China and 
Taiwan, p. 24) 
Eisenstadat and Roniger 'argue that the family is the initial 'coalition' on 
which unconditional trust is based (1984). If the father was 'dragon' or 'phoenix', 
the son should be 'dragon' or 'phoenix' . The situation replicated that of the 
feudal China in which the traditional family structure was also linked to the 
'politics of the emperor's relatives on his wife's side of his family' (waiqi), which 
took advantage of their special privilege to promote their offspring to higher 
positions of power. As well, the Taizidang also reflects the strong influence of 
Confucianism. Of course, Taizidang not only depend on their own family 
background, but also rely on GuanXi or patron-client relations. Under the 
unwritten code of 'caring for the children of old comrades-in-arms, old work-
mates, old superiors, and old subordinates' (huxiang zhaogu laozhanyou laotongshi 
laoshangji laobuxia de zinu), a number of princes of old political elites have been 
promoted to important positions of the state and the Party, ranging from premier 
to provincial governors. 
4. The evezyday reality of GuanXi 
GuanXi and nepotism penetrate all ranks of Chinese society today, not 
only the political elite. The only difference is that for the common people it 
emphasizes material interests, rather than seeking political power. This network 
of GuanXi in every day life is a system in which an individual develops a series 
of acquaintances for whom favors are done in the expectation of returned favors 
at some time in the future. Having good GuanXi proves to be an extremely 
useful way of getting things done in a resource-scarce environment (fmding a 
good job, getting a good house and good pay, etc.). It takes many forms, varying 
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all the way from perfectly legal 'string pulling' with small gifts and favors, to out-
right corruptions, involving bribery and criminal actions. Nevertheless, GuanXi 
works for those able to use it. 
For example, one of my friends went to work at the International 
Investment and Trust Corporation, which is one of the best companies in my 
hometown. It is difficult to become an employee if you don't have good GuanXi 
with company officials (lingdao), even though you may have high qualifications. 
There are only forty employees in the company. Of these, 35 have many kinds of 
GuanXi with the lingdao. Some of them are children of 'old comrades-in-arms', 
or 'work-mates', or 'old superiors' and 'old subordinates'. Their parents had 
established good GuanXi a long time before. (My friend's father was supervisor 
of the current president many years ago, so it was easy for my friend to become 
an employee of that company). Employees became 'clients' of the lingdao. So 
people always say': "even though you have thousands of good things and thousands 
of good qualities, you are nothing as long as you do not have a 'good father"'. 
GuanXi causes serious corruption in the Chinese bureaucracy. The policy 
of "reform and open to the rest world" created numerous opportunities for 
GuanXi . From the beginning of 1978, Deng Xiaoping and his followers set out 
to re-establish some private incentives in China's economy, which had reached the 
brink of collapse after the Cultural Revolution. Their intentions were to assert 
individuals' rights · to transact with each other and therefore ease problems 
encountered in the central coordination of agricultural and industrial production. 
Their aim was to gradually change the economic system from a central planning 
economy to a quasi-market economy. To do this, they established some private 
property rights and allowed decentralized markets a large role in allocating scarce 
goods. Within these markets they allowed prices to fluctuate (Sands 1990). Since 
there is no strict scientific management and institutionalized bureaucracy, abuse 
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of governmental authority and the use of GuanXi became serious problems. 
Because both prices and supplies of consumer goods were fixed too low, one only 
obtained many goods either by standing in lines or using GuanXi. Those who had 
bureaucratic connections clearly gained under this system. If one had access to 
a scarce good, one could parley this access into increased command over other 
goods through direct exchange. (This phenomenon was called houmen , or 
backdoor.) Many officials found themselves in an excellent position to 'get rich' 
and to 'glorify' themselves, because they had some control over distribution. 
GuanXi has caused other problems for the Chinese bureaucracy. First, it 
has caused millions of Yuan in states funds to flow into the hands of small 
collectives and individuals through numerous loopholes, thus seriously 
undermining the Chinese economic reform. Second, corruptions caused by using 
public office for private gain and pursuing personal comfort have seriously 
undermined the credibility of the reform process. Third, the legitimacy of the 
national government is undermined, as the events in the Tianmen Square clearly 
show. 
Why can't the Chinese Communist Party rid itself of GuanXi , and 
nepotism? There are three main reasons: (1) The P.R.C. was established and 
developed on an agrarian societal base that is only beginning to industrialize. 
These patterns cannot be done away with quickly or easily. (2) The 
overcentralized power of the Chinese Communist Party favors patron-client 
exchange, GuanXi and nepotism. There is no institutionalized bureaucracy to 
constrain the absolute power of the Party which promotes 'personality politics' 
(renzhi); (3) The privileges of the Party foster the development of GuanXi and 
nepotism. To acquire scarce resources, individuals have to establish good GuanXi 
and form their own network if they want to live better and feel more secure. 
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Summary 
Patronage, nepotism and favoritism are deeply rooted in the agrarian 
pattern of Chinese society. Although the Chinese leaders are motivated by a 
desire to get rid of these imperial legacies, the monopoly power of the 
Communist Party and the overcentralization of the bureaucracy exacerbates 
these informal relations in Chinese society. It is difficult for the Chinese 
government to change the structure of 'personality politics' and Party sovereignty, 
so that these informal relationships continue to undermine the development of 
a rational political process. Moreover, the low level of industrial development 
does not permit a rapid restructuring of the polity in a more rational-legal 
direction (Lenski et al. 1990). 
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Chapter 5 The Chinese Bureaucracy in an Era of Gradual Industrialization 
Agrarian societies with their low standard of living for the majority of the 
population, low efficiency technologies, and low investment in human capital 
could not sustain large-scale institutions along the lines of Weber's ideal-type 
bureaucracy. This situation persisted in industrializing agrarian societies like 
China in recent decades. In this chapter I will discuss additional features of 
China's political bureaucracy not anticipated from Weber's framework. 
L Personalized rule and acute political struggle 
According to Weber, in an organization based on rational-legal authority 
with an emphasis on formal rules and procedures, political leaders should act in 
obedience to the requirements of the law and not in accordance with personal 
whim. But in China the political process operates in a different way. The one 
party system cannot avoid serious political struggles like those which occurred in 
the imperial era. During the Cultural Revolution, the personalized rule of Mao 
Zedong reached an apex, as we saw in chapter 3. After Mao consolidated his 
power, he purged Liu Shaoqi, the former Chairman of the country. This was a 
continuation of the political struggles that were so familiar in the agrarian polity. 
One problem concerns strongly centralized decision making. Political 
decisions are firmly controlled by the Party Politburo, the Secretariat, the Military 
Affairs Commission, and the Government State Council. A few high level 
officials decide the fate of the Chinese people. But Chinese leaders have seldom 
obeyed formal rules and bureaucratic procedures when they made decisions. The 
reform policy regarding Chinese agriculture was a good example of this. A group 
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of young intellectuals visited the countryside to investigate how to increase the 
living standards of peasants. In 1978, after two years of investigation, they 
proposed "responsibility fanning" which designated the household as an unit 
responsible for productivity after the household head singed a contract for a piece 
of land with the village government. When Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Zhiyang 
read this proposal, they implemented it without further discussion. 
Because the moderate reformers could not tolerate some points of radical 
reform, they launc_hed several campaigns: "anti-bourgeois liberalism" in 1981, 
"anti-spiritual pollution" and "socialist civilization" in 1985. All of this exemplified 
an acute power struggle between the moderates and the radicals (Harding 1987). 
Because political leaders of the two major factions, moderate Chun Yun and the 
more radical Deng Xiaoping, had difficulty agreeing, they frequently contradicted 
each other. They set the ideological tone, helped shape the agenda, and provided 
initiative and discipline for their clients. Both Hu Yaobang's resignation in 1987 
and Zhao Zhiyang's removal in 1~89 were the results of power struggles. Those 
within the Party who wanted to reform the political structure were rendered 
ineffective. This situation caused the reforms to always be in a state of instability 
and change. 
There is another example which helps explain why Chinese leaders do not 
obey the formal rules and procedures of bureaucracy. Deng reportedly called 
Zhao Zhiyang in for a meeting on price reform in May 1988, and complained that 
"our pace has not been fast enough"; "wemust adopt bolder measures; do not be 
afraid to take risk"; "do not care about opposition of the moderate reformers". 
So, Zhao Zhiyang gave out the order to lift price controls so prices could float 
according to supply and demand. But price reform caused serious inflation which 
had never occurred before in socialist China. In the first quarter of 1988, price 
for nonstaple foods went up by 24.2 percent, with a rise of 48. 7 percent in the 
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prices of fresh vegetables (Asian Survey 1989). This brought serious criticism from 
the moderate reformers, especially Chun Yun, Yao Yinling, and Li Peng. 
Meanwhile, Deng Xiaoping was also pressured by the moderate reformers. This 
caused Deng to complain, "I would not vouch for anyone. If the situation 
continues to deteriorate, I will have to have Zhao dismissed". The dysfunctional 
consequences of price reform became a prelude to Zhao's removal. After that 
time, the Chinese reform movement almost reversed itself. The moderate 
reformers started to make conservative policy. So, Chun Yun wrote: 
"No one alone will be able to secure power. Only by forming 
factions can people secure their power and positions. As a result, 
there naturally are parties outside the Party, and factions within the 
Party. No faction dares to be careless in dealing with other 
factions, and they would rather suspect others than believe in them. 
This is the way they treat other factions, and do not they do the 
same to comrades of their own faction? Everyone feels insecure 
and is on guard all the time." (Chun Yun 1980, p. 83). 
The seriousness of these power struggles made the achievement of 
rational-legal authority. very difficult. The Chinese leaders did not care about 
existing rules or regulations, they only depended on their personal judgment and 
behavior. These factors were a major obstacle to the realization of an efficient 
bureaucracy. 
2. Ambiguous functions and overlapping ministries 
Ambiguous functions and overlapping ministries reflect a situation in which 
governmental goals and procedures are not spelled out and the level of 
productivity stays low. Administration remains relatively unspecialized. Although 
Chinese bureaucracy has expanded much more in the past decade than in any 
other period of Chinese history, there is no stable specialized division of function, 
and the top leaders often bypass the processes of bureaucracy in order to make 
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policy decisions peremptorily. 
We can examine the low degree of specialization from three aspects as 
follows: 
First, there is no clearly specialized division between the Party, the 
government, and the military. Their structures overlap each other and form many 
interlocking organizations. At the beginning of the 1950's, the Party gradually 
took over daily administration which should have been performed by the 
government. The Party usurps the functions of the various levels of government 
even now, (although the Chinese leaders advocated a separation between them 
after 1978). The Party dominates everything, not only at the upper level 
leadership but also at low levels. Second, overlapping governmental organization 
lacks an institutionalized division of labor and cooperation. Sometimes, officials 
of many central commissions or ministries and local organizations pose the 
question: where is the power (the means to make some decision and perform it)? 
Actually, they all hold some power, but each lacks the ability to make the policy 
decisions. I think this situation reflects a low level of coordination. The lack of 
coordination shows in three ways: (1) The different commissions and ministries 
constantly wrangle with each other and always make contradictory policies. (2) 
No commission or ministry can make any important policies independently, they 
must negotiate with others repeatingly before making any decisions; (3) since all 
reform policies must consider the benefit of all commissions or ministries, it is 
very difficult to make a comprehensive reform policy. 
Third, the top leaders frequently circumvent rules and regulations to make 
personal decisions about policy. Both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping were 
instinctively opposed to bureaucracy (although Deng advocated some rational 
reform close to the ideal-type). They feared bureaucracy because it could 
constrain their individual supreme power. Thus, they made decisions through 
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their assistants or clients. The reform policy of "Opening 14 Special Economic 
Zones" was decided suddenly after Deng Xiaoping visited the ShengZheng 
(Guangdong province) in 1985. It was not deliberated on by various government 
departments that would be affected. Instead it was put into effect directly 
through the office of Deng. 
The lack of specialization and cooperation in both the Chinese Party and 
the government leads to irresponsibility. The overlapping functions has promoted 
organizational expansion that appears uncontrollable. The Chinese Party and the 
government have tried again and again to cut back on the proliferation of 
government offices. They proposed a "revolutionary, youthful, knowledgeable, 
and specialized" approach to government to replace "timidity, inertia and 
obstructionism". But they always fell into a vicious cycle of "simplifying--
expanding--resimplifying--reexpanding". The first retrenchment was in 1958, when 
they decreased the commissions and ministries from 82 to 60. By 1965, the 
number had grown to more than 80 again. In 1970, the second retrenchment 
occurred, cutting back to 33 organizations, but in 1981 the number had expanded 
to 98. In 1982, the third retrenchment resulted in a reduction to 56, but in 1988, 
it reexpanded to 98 again. 
J.,_ A fragmented, segmented and stratified system 
China shows another feature of an industrializing agrarian polity: a lack 
of coordination between the central authority and local administration. Below 
the apex, the Chinese system consists of a bewildering number of national 
agencies, as well as provincial and local units (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1986). 
So the process of realizing government policy is very scattered, and local 
governments have considerable de facto autonomy. Since they are assigned 
abundant resources and specific permission, they have such strong self-reliance 
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that they can become careless and distort the policy coming from the central 
government in Beijing. Along with political economic reform, local governments 
have received even more authority, such as control of their budgets, taxes, 
materials, etc. Although every province and city should carry out the policy of 
the central government, the relationship between them is not institutionalized. 
Many important policies are put into effect largely through an informal system 
of consultation and compromise, quite independently of organizational 
procedures. 
In this situation, the relationship between the central government and local 
government is in confusion. Whether or not to completely follow the central 
policy becomes a recurrent question. The central government sometimes 
attempts to recentralize the power which had been given to the localities. But 
as soon as the central government does this, officials of almost every province 
complain that when the policy was tightened, it was difficult to complete the kinds 
of plans which the central government asked of them; then the central 
government has to decentralize its authority again. The abnormal relationship 
between levels of government created another vicious cycle: centralism leads to 
rigidity, rigidity leads to complaints, complaints lead to decentralization, 
decentralizations leads to disorder, and disorder leads back to centralization 
(Jiang Yiwei. See Gorden White 1983). Deng Xiaoping spoke to this problem 
when he said: "since we can delegate power, we can also retrieve it any time we 
like". The Chinese leaders are wary of too much centralization fearing it would 
dampen the enthusiasm of the localities; but if they decentralize authority, it 
would cause localism and confusion. It is difficult to resolve such contradictions. 
The confused relationship between the central and local governments has 
two aspects. The first is that the "contradiction between central policy directives 
and specific local requirements as well as the 'leaky' quality of power in a 
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complex hierarchy have led to informal decentralization within the Party and 
government, notably the phenomenon of 'independent kingdoms' under the local 
party" (Harding 1987, p. 37). As a matter of fact, local Party and government 
officials always alter central policy in accordance with their own interests. 
Sometimes they twisted their execution of the central policy for their own benefit. 
Guangdong province ,is a good example of this. It not only applied the "reform 
and open to the rest of the world" concept to all fields of political economy 
completely and flexibly, but also refused some central policies which were not 
suited to the situation of Guangdong province. 
The second is the ubiquitous "bargaining" phenomenon in the Chinese 
government. These bargains are generally negotiated among commissions or 
ministries to serve both administrative and personal objectives. According to my 
experience (I was at the Foreign Exchange Administration of the People's Bank 
of the Central Government with my president to bargain the business scope of 
our corporation), 1· found that no one strictly obeys the regulations. Actually the 
higher the position of the official, the less likely he is to obey. In the bargaining 
process, GuanXi is most important. That is, if you offer me (a higher level 
person) special assistance, I will offer you special favors in return. We had good 
GuanXi with the head of the Foreign Exchange Bureau, so we got a broad range 
of business. Especially, we got permission to borrow foreign currency from the 
international money market. This is the result of bargaining for privileges. 
Because if we did not have good GuanXi with them, we could not have gotten 
the right to borrow foreign currency from abroad directly. Of course, in the 
process of bargaining, bribes and corruption easily arise. 
Between the localities (provinces, directed cities, special economic zones) 
and the central government, there is always bargaining for privilege regarding 
policies that include all kinds of annual plans, budgets, and revenues. The 
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success of bargaining for each province depends on its local government's 
economic wealth, geographic factors, and the special relationship with the top 
leaders. Guangdong, Fujfan and the special economic zones have gotten many 
privileges through the bargaining procedure. This is why you hear people in 
China say: "If the central government gave us these privileges, we could be 
successful just like Guangdong province." Whether or not bargaining is successful 
becomes a critical factor for local and regional economic development. 
The central. government actually loses the power to implement sound 
policy, thereby causing an unstable and changeable policy. To give an example, 
the central government in Beijing had a policy of strictly controlling investment 
in basic construction. But there existed the bargaining for privileges, because 
local governments did not like such strict control. This caused many duplicated 
investments and brought about huge financial waste. to tlie country. The central 
government also wanted to control the foreign currency available to each 
province and control the importing of advanced technology and machinery. But 
each province wanted to import products according to their own desire. They 
ignored the "whole" situation of China, and they only paid attention to their own 
interests. That has caused a serious situation today. From the beginning of 
reform in 1978 to 1991, there were more than one hundred assembly plants 
producing color televisions of various brands in China ( every province has three 
or five factories, all imported to the U. S. A., Japan or West Germany). Each 
assembly plant requires foreign currency to import materials and spare parts. But 
foreign currency is very scarce in China. So it is impossible to satisfy the needs 
of all the plants. Many of them have become idle while a lot of foreign currency 
was wasted. 
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4. Results of top-down development 
A fourth problem is top-down development. It is obvious that when the 
Communist Party established the People Republic of China, Mao Zedong came 
to place the struggle for people's hearts and minds ahead of the struggle to 
transform the economy (Lenski et al. 1991). The Party and government have 
always emphasized that they represent, to the utmost, the interests of the Chinese 
people. That is to say, the will of the Party is also the people's will. They usually 
indoctrinated the Chinese people to accept the Party's programs through many 
kinds of propaganda. But this communication had only one direction: from the 
top-down. Elites made development plans or policies according to their own 
political view, not in accordance with the people's interests. They did not care 
about what the people thought. They completely ignored the varied interests of 
the people. This situation was like Perrow's (1986) criticism of the Classical 
Management Theory where supervisors or managers only considered employees 
as tools or parts of machinery, and they were never to be given consideration 
(even though they finally did get some care, because employers needed them to 
keep production going). In China, the Chinese people became a tool or victim 
of the power struggles. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution 
clearly showed this. 
Under these circumstances, illustrated above, on one hand, people do not 
understand what the Party wants to do, and on the other hand, people only care 
about themselves. Sometimes, the policy of the Party and government was 
misunderstood and "twisted". People did not want to become victims of mass 
movements, like the Great Leap Forward and the Culture Revolution. This 
caused many policies to be given up halfway. People did not believe in the Party 
and the government. Also, some people always adopted an opportunistic attitude 
toward the policies of the Party. Meanwhile most of people took advantage of 
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patronage to protect themselves. The patronage relationship always makes it easy 
to bring about factionism that prevents realization of policy. Therefore, it is 
hardly possible to fully perform the policy. 
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Summary 
The Chinese Communist Party attempted to rid the people of feudal 
consciousness after they took national power, but ironically in many ways they 
only intensified it: (1) The power of the Party surpasses any rule of law and the 
constitution. No one can constrain its absolute power. This is just like imperial 
polity inc Chinese history. (2) The privilege of the Party fosters the development 
of patrimonial relations--patronage, 'GuanXi' and 'bargaining'. 'Going the back 
door' became universal. The privilege of the Party causes corruption to become 
a serious problem in itself. (3) Abuse of power to further personal interests 
divorces the leaders from the masses. Inefficiency and irresponsibility become 
part of the privilege of the Party elite. All of these critically prevent the Chinese 
government from approaching Weber's ideal type of rational-legal authority which 
is based on functional efficiency, impersonal performance of duties, and a 
coordinated and flexible hierarchical structure. 
Thus, there are many obstacles to the Chinese Party and the government 
realizing Weber's ideal-type rational-legal authority. In this chapter I have 
discussed (1) personalized rule and acute political struggles, (2) ambiguous 
functions and overlapping ministries, (3) a fragmented, segmented, and stratified 
system, and (4) the abnormal result of top-down development. However, the 
deeper underlying cause, as Lenski et al. suggest, is the persistence of an agrarian 
technological base well into the post-Revolutionary period. 
77 
Part m China After Mao 
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Chapter 6 Deng's Political Economic Reforms 
When Mao died in 1976, Chinese political and economic structure was 
almost on the brink of collapse. Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader after 
Mao, proposed a policy of "reform and openness to the outside world" and 
emphasized the gradual establishment of more open and flexible national 
economy with modem technology and advanced management. Other higher 
leaders of post-Maoist China also recognized the present political economic 
structure that hindered Chinese modernization. Former Premier Zhao Zhiyang 
noted that: "China's existing political structure was born out of the war years, 
basically established in the period of social transformation and developed in the 
course of large-scale mass movements and incessantly intensifying mandatory 
planning .. .it fails to suit economic, political and cultural modernization under 
peacetime conditions or the development of a socialist commodity economy" 
(Zhao Zhiyang 1986). 
China has made great strides in the economic field since Deng's dramatic 
reform policies were inaugurated in 1978. Hary Harding calls this 'the Chinese 
second revolution' (1987). Deng Xiaoping once remarked that "the purpose of 
socialism is to make the country rich and strong" (New York Times, Dec. 30, 
1980). The regime of Deng Xiaoping has not only accommodated China to the 
world capitalist market but accommodated itself to China's existing social 
structure, even while attempting to rationalize and 'modernize' it (Meisner 1989). 
Thus, Deng has said "what is good enough for capitalism, evidently, is good 
enough for socialism" (emphasizing the economic field) (Beijing Review, Sep. 13, 
1987). A cornerstone of Deng's policy has been greater emphasis on market 
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mechanisms and less emphasis on centralized economic planning. 
L China's progress under Deng 
During the 1980's, China's relative growth in economic output has 
outperformed the industrial countries and the world as a whole (Table 13). The 
rural population of China for the first time decreased to 48.3 percent in 1989 
(See P 32 table 10). This reflects a shift toward greater industrial employment. 
The labor force employed in industry and the service sector increased 119 percent 
between 1981 and 1989 (Business China 1990). This is important evidence of the 
trend toward industrial society. Industrial output increased throughout the 1980s 
(Table 14). Meanwhile, the Chinese people's living standard has also improved 
(Table 15). 
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China Compared with Other Groups of Countries 
(Percentage Change, per Year) 
Average per Year 
1981- 1984 1985 1986 1987 
1986 
8.8 12.0 12.3 7.0 7.0 
2.7 4.S 3.4 3.0 3.2 
LS 2.2 2.0 2.S 2.7 
2.2 4.7 2.9 2.4 2.6 
2.4 6.4 2.8 2.6 2.7 
LS 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.4 
3.6 S.1 4.S 2.S 2.6 










Source: Adapted from United Nations, 1987 World Economic Survey 1987: Current Trends and 
Policies in the World Economyy (New York: United Nations), P 13, Table 11.L (See Smith, 
Christopher J. 1990). 
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Table 14. Output of Selected Major Industrial (Consumer) Products, 
China, 1979, 1983, 1987 
1979 1983 1987 1987 as a 
% of 1979 
Chemical fibers 32.6 54.1 117.5 +360 
(10,000 tons) 
Machine-made paper 493 661 1,141 +229 
(10,000 tons) 
Synthetic detergents 32.4 67.7 119.2 +370 
(10,000 tons) 
Bicycles 1,009 2,758 4,117 +408 
(10,000) 
Wristwatches (10,000) 1,750 3,478 6,159 +349 
Canned food 50.1 84.5 161.5 +322 
(10,000 tons) 
Beer (10,000 tons) 52 163 540 +1,038 
Cigarettes (10,000 case) 1,303 1,938 2,881 +216 
Source: adapt~ from Christopher J. Smith, 1991, P 112. ( China: Statistical Yearbook 1988) 
Table 15. Ownership of Selected Consumer Durable Goods 
(1978, 1982, and 1987) 
No. Owned per 100 
persons 
<Whole of China) 
1978 1982 1987 
Sewing machines 3.5 6.6 11.0 
Wristwatches 8.5 18.8 42.8 
Bicycles 7.7 13.1 27.1 
Radios 7.8 18.2 24.1 
Television sets 0.3 2.7 10.7 
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Source: Adapted from Christopher J. Smith, 1991, P 169 and China Statistical 
Yearbook 1988. 
Deng's refonn policy moved forward on two major directions: (1) The first 
of these was the decentralization of administrative power and economic decision-
making. In a series of stages, greater autonomy was granted to regional 
authorities as well as to individual enterprises. (2) Market principles were 
introduced into the socialist command economy. Privately owned industrial 
enterprises were encouraged to develop in the economy (Table 16). These issues 
will be observed in the following section. 
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Table 16. The Increase of Privately Owned Industrial Enterprises and Percentage of Total Gross Output Value, 
1985-1987 
1985 1986 1987 
% of % of Total % of % of Total % of % of Total 
Total No. Output Value Total No. Output Value Total No. Output Value 
State enterprises 1.81 64.9 1.44 62.3 1.31 59.7 
Collective 33.60 32.1 27.2 33.5 24.30 34.6 
enterprises 
Private 
enterprises 64.60 1.8 71.30 2.8 74.30 3.6 
In cities and town 6.40 5.50 6.60 
In rural areas 58.20 65.80 67.70 
Source: Adapted from Christopher ·1. Smith, 1991 ( China Statistical Yearbook 1988) 
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2. Political economic reform in China 
After 1949, the Chinese Communist Party set up a central, hierarchial 
administrative structure. All power and authority of the state was in the hands of 
the central government with the National People's Congress serving as the highest 
organ of the state authority, and the State Council serving as its executive organ. 
Under the Council, there were appropriately one hundred ministries, 
commissions, general bureaus, and many special agencies. The second level of 
the administration includes thirty-one provinces, five autonomous districts, three 
centrally administrated cities, and 14 special economic zones (Before 1978, there 
were no Special Economic Zones.) All policies were made by the central 
committee and the politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. Economic 
development was centrally planed. Power was overcentralized and relations 
between the Party and the government were ambiguous. The Party's intrusion 
into political, economic and social life became a serious obstacle to developing 
the national economy. 
The Chinese Communist Party leaders, Deng Xiaoping and other veteran 
officials considered it critical to change the economic structure. Since the Third 
Plenum of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Central Committee in 1978, 
a complex political economic reform has been underway. The regime established 
new policies designed to foster rapid economic development. These policies well 
known by now: reprivatization of the economy; increased material incentives to 
encourage labor productivity; attacking of egalitarian practices that interfered 
with economic efficiency; political relaxation to mobilize support for the regime; 
and professional, economic, and intellectual exchange with the advanced capitalist 
countries. These changes resulted in a shift to a more individualized conception 
of economic organization and activity (Dirlik 1989). 
Under Deng, the Party attempted to inaugurate a new era of relationship 
with the governmental administration. 
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Functional specialization and 
organizational separation were stressed, and the previous tendency of the Party 
to exercise direct supervision over government activities has been criticized. 
Decentralized decision making was extended to localities, basic level production 
units, and enterprises (White 1984). 
The policy can be summarized in several propositions: enterprise should 
be given initiative. and authority over production planning; prices should be 
adjusted to accurately reflect a balance between supply and demand; regions 
should be encouraged to specialize in those products for which they possess a 
comparative advantage; and economic levers should gradually replace 
administrative orders as the mechanisms for state regulation of the economy (Hu 
Qiamu 1978). As evidence of the success of this policy, China's economy has 
posted an annual average increase of 9 percent since 1978. More evidence of the 
success of Deng's pragmatism can be seen by looking at the economic 
achievement of Guangdong province. 
:i,_ The relationship between decentralization and economic achievement in 
Guangdong Province 
Guangdong province has a unique advantage because of its coastline of 
2,400 kilometers and its proximity to the seaport of Hong Kong. Guangdong is 
not like Liangning and Sichuan provinces which have massive industrial bases, 
abundant resources and a huge investment from the central government during 
1960's and 1970's. As a consequence, Guangdong has been permitted greater 
independence and autonomy than many of the other provinces, especially the 
internal provinces. Thus, Guangdong leaped ahead of the internal provinces. It 
was able to make many reforms on its own, such as a low corporation tax (15 
percent), tax holidays, inexpensive land and services, greater freedom in labor 
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management, and ·increased access to a market economy. The governors of 
Guangdong (Ren Zhongyi, Ye Xuanping) directed the reform adopting the 
following guidelines: "If something is not explicitly prohibited, then move ahead" 
and "if something is allowed, then use it to the hilt" (See Vegol 1989, p. 81). 
Fortunately, Guangdong was not much affected by the attack on "bourgeois 
liberalization" in 1980, the campaign against "spiritual pollution" in the ideological 
and cultural spheres in 1980, and the crackdown on corruption in 1985. Even 
though in 1987, the central government tried to slow economic growth 
nationwide, it appears that the theme was "business as usual" in Guangdong. 
Officials in the province and lower level officials seemed set on continuing the 
province's high level of growth. With Guangdong province's supply of local 
capital and economic and political savvy, the central government in Beijing had 
difficulty enforcing its "slow down" policy. 
In a little more than 10 years, Guangdong has created an "economic 
miracle" that even surpasses Taiwan and Korea. The economy of sixty-million 
people (compared to Taiwan's twenty-million and South Korea's .s~venty-two 
million) has grown at an average annual rate of 16.5 percent over the ten years, 
a growth rate that exceeds Taiwan and Korea (Shirk 1989, p. 919). The GNP of 
Guangdong province has already grown to 150 billion RMB in 1989, nearly one-
tenth of the entire GNP of China (Zhen 1990, pp. 38-9). How did Guangdong 
accomplished this "economic miracle" in such a short time? What were the 
foundations of such rapid economic development? 
During the Cultural Revolution, the Party and the government were fused 
to a very large extent at the provincial level and below. During the reform 
movement, a effort was made to separate them. The Party no longer directly 
intervenes in detailed administrative matters. There is now greater 
professionalism in public administration, and administration by technocrats over 
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government bureaus, economic enterprises, and grassroots organizations (Harding 
1987). Former premier Zhao Ziyang explained the general concept behind 
structural reform in his report on the Seventh Five-Year plan, given at the 
National People's Congress in April 1986. Zhao said that the Party should no 
longer be responsible for "assigning quotas, approving construction projects, and 
allotting funds and mandatory planning", and the government bureaucracy should 
conduct " overall planning, implement policies, organize coordination, provide 
services, use economic means of regulation, and exercise effective inspection and 
supervision." (Zhao 1986, See Harding 1987, p. 226). In short, as the economy 
was transformed from a centrally planned system into a regulated market, the 
function of the government departments had to change as well. Although the 
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party is still at the core of bringing 
modernization to China, the Party no longer crudely interferes with economic 
development and social life as it did before. The government is increasingly 
relying on indirect methods to control economic development. This new system 
is helping to replace, to some extent, centralized bureaucratic measures "by the 
use of market force and price mechanisms to create a structure in which basic-
level units and individuals are given a much larger measure of autonomy than 
before to respond to economic incentives" (Xue Muqiao 1980, p. 7). 
In recent years, the government of Guangdong province has significantly 
moved toward decentralization. The provincial government began to use macro-
economic levers--prices, 
influence development. 
taxation, and fiscal policy as indirect methods to 
Guangdong has not only attracted large financial 
investment from abroad and from the internal provinces, but has also reduced the 
contradictions between the government and the enterprises which existed in the 
internal provinces. These things created an excellent environment for economic 
growth. 
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Decentralization is a major reason for Guangdong's success. It gives the 
local government greater power to enact its own regulations, adopt its own 
legislation and adjust the central policy to meet local conditions. Some of the 
responsibility for economic planning may also be transferred to the municipal 
levels (Harding 1987). The decentralization of economic management was 
implemented by establishing 14 relatively self-reliant economic regions. There 
are also five special economic zones in Guangdong Province. 
The government of Guangdong not only has greater relative autonomy and 
a decentralized allocation of authority from the central government in Beijing, but 
also gave its power to the lower counties and productive enterprises. The 
governor recognized that enterprise vitality required greater autonomy and a 
change in the direction of the government's role from providing microeconomic 
supervision to giving macroeconomic guidelines and increasing the role of the 
market. Many enterprises had enough freedom from higher level planning that 
even if they were subject to supervision by the local Party and government 
officials, they were able to begin responding to new economic opportunities much 
as enterprises in the industrial capitalist societies. Managers were made 
responsible for the direction of sales, capital, labor, and materials. Given 
autonomy, the managers of enterprises in Guangdong Province are showing great 
initiative. Their administrative style has been forged by competition in the 
market. While pursuing profits, they enhance the wealth of Guangdong Province. 
This demonstrates what Adam Smith wrote: " The harmony between individual 
self-interest and the goal of the commonwealth were achieved through 
competition" (Heilbroner 1986, p. 161). 
In my opinion, decentralization and the idea that 'what is good enough for 
capitalism, evidently, is good enough for socialism' are the foundations of the 
economic miracle in Guangdong province. After separation between the Party 
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and the government, the leaders of Guangdong have successfully divorced the 
Party from interlerence in economic affairs · as well. Meanwhile, they have 
adopted a comprehensive framework of macro-economic levers to promote 
economic development. They have professionalized government administration 
and democratized local government. The slogan "To the outside, more open; to 
the inside, looser; to those below, more leeway" sums up the policy adopted by 
Guangdong Provin_ce. 
It is interesting to note that this experiment with economic laissez-faire has 
a precedent in Chinese history. The ancient Chinese philosopher, Lao Shi said:" 
So long as I 'do nothing', the people will of themselves be transformed; so long 
as I love quietude, the people will of themselves go straight; so long as I act only 
by inactivity, the people will of themselves become prosperous; so long as I have 
no wants the people will of themselves return to the 'state of the uncarved block' 
(Lao Zhi 1968, p. 211, See Waley). He also said: "Does nothing, yet achieves 
everything" (Lao Zhi 1968, p. 200, See Waley). That .is not to say that the 
government does not care about the development of- the society at all, but _the 
government refrains. from interlering with the freedom of people and economic . . -
development. The central government . gives localities and people enough 
autonomy to promote economic development and social progress. 
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Summary 
In a little more than ten years, the structure of Guangdong's political 
economy has experienced great change. The people, the entei:prises, the 
govermnent and the Party, all agree that the first step is to develop the economy, 
thereby raising the living standard. The situation is a result of Deng's 
pragmatism. But Guangdong's economic achievement like the rest of China's 
economic reform has beert counter-balanced by Deng's ideological conservatism. 
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Chapter 7 Persistence of a Dominant Ideology 
Lenski et al. state, "Today, in all but the most backward parts of the 
industrializing agrarian world, there is an intellectual ferment and a clash of ideas 
between the advocates of traditional belief systems and the proponents of newer 
ones. The situation is often extremely complicated, because both traditionalists 
and modernizers differ among themselves on many points, while others favor 
various blends of the old and the new" (1991, p. 381). This situation is found in 
present-day China. Deng's goal has not been to create a revolutionary society 
(like Mao's launching of the Cultural Revolution), but to achieve a "pragmatic 
adjustment of revolution to the demands of present reality" (Dirlik and Meisner 
1989, p. 7). Deng's pragmatic economic reform is different from Mao's utopian 
social revolution. Deng represented the Chinese pragmatic leaders in the post-
Mao era and did not believe in Mao's 'class struggle' and his personality cult. On 
the contrary, Deng proposed to repair the damage of thirty years of 'class 
struggle'. Deng wanted to get on with the task of national development but this 
required an ideology that would preserve political stability. 
L. Conservative ideology in post-Maoist China 
For Gramsci (and many other Marxists), a major source of domination 
rests in the process of ideological hegemony in addition to ownership of the 
means of production. The keys to success are ideological as well as economic. 
To achieve ideological hegemony, the leaders of a historical bloc must develop 
a universal view that appeals to a wide range of other groups within the society, 
and they must be able to claim with plausibility that their particular interests are 
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those of society at large. In fact, hegemony on "a massive scale, is bound to be 
uneven in the degree of legitimacy it commands and to leave some room for 
antagonistic cultural expressions to develop" (Adamson 1973, p. 5). 
When the Party under Deng performed political economic reform, it never 
forgot to employ the dominant ideology of the 'four principles'. Deng said that 
reform must not challenge the 'four principles'. The core of the principles was 
the Chinese Comiilunist Party's monopoly of power. Deng claimed that without 
the exclusive and unquestioned leadership of his own Party, a country as large, 
fractious, and backward as China would crumble into chaos (See Nathan 1990, 
p. 2). 
Since 1976, the Chinese Communist Party has on a number of occasions 
attempted to put the record straight on Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution. 
Cynics have referred to such actions (with some justification) as attempts to falsify 
or reinterpret history to better fit with the outlook of Post-Maoist China. 
Because Mao's ideology of 'class struggle' failed to develop the national economy 
and raise living standards, it created widespread disillusionment after the Cultural 
Revolution. Thus, the Party communique stated that "the large-scale turbulent 
class struggles of a mass character have in the main come to an end" and decreed 
that the Party and people should shift their attention to socialist modernization. 
From The Third Plenum in December 1978, there came the endorsement of 
national discussions on criterion of truth in order to demystify and demythologize 
Mao. In the speech of vice-chairman Ye Jianying on September 17, 1979, he 
said, "We must oppose the view that advocates class struggle, to say nothing of 
creating so-called class struggle out of the void. The basic goal of revolution is 
to liberate and develop the social prodm;:tive force, to improve living standards 
of the Chinese people" (Beijing Review 1979). The 'four principles' became the 
dominant political ideology to go along with pragmatic economic reforms. The 
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Party leaders have used these cardinal principles to combat unorthodox ideas. 
From 1978 to 1979, there were a series of ideological arguments against 
Marxism and Mao Zedong's thought. The main idea was to use Western 
concepts of democracy, freedom and human rights to evaluate the thirty years of 
Chinese socialism and to repudiate Maoism completely. Thus Wei Jingsheng 
argued, "The leaders of our nation must be informed that we want to take our 
destiny into our own hands. We want no more gods and emperors; no more 
saviors of any kind. We want to be masters of our own country .... Democracy, 
freedom and happiness are the only gods of modernization. Without this fifth 
modernization, the four others are nothing more than a new-fangled lie" (Quoted 
in G. Barme and J. Minford ed. 1986, p. 227). 
According to this opinion, socialism had failed in China. The Party and 
its leaders had reimposed a feudalist totalitarianism, just like the imperial 
emperor in Chinese history. If the Chinese people wished to modernize, they 
must first establish democracy and modernize China's social system. Without 
democracy society would sink into stagnation, and economic growth would 
encounter insurmountable obstacles. The people should share the power with the 
Party and end the monopoly of communist control. In a word, everything was 
bad in socialist China. Only democracy, freedom and human rights could save 
China. The whole society was undergoing a 'crisis of faith'. Some people began 
to doubt the leadership of the Communist Party and Marxist-Leninism, and Mao 
Zedong's thought was bitterly attacked. 
With the Party's hegemony in peril, Deng Xiaoping proclaimed the 'four 
principles' to guide the country in March 1979. The 'four principles' refer to (1) 
upholding the socialist road, (2) the dictatorship of the people's democracy, (3) 
the leadership of the communist Party, and (4) the guidance of Marxism-Leninism 
and Mao Zedong's thought. The aim of advocating the 'four principles' was to 
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ask people to obey them, thereby preventing them from being affected by any 
oppositional ideas. Meanwhile the Party used the principle of the 'dictatorship 
of the people's democracy' to arrest Wei Jinsheng and others who were accused 
of violating the Chinese Constitution by propagating anti-socialist thoughts. 
Democracy and freedom, according to the Party, could only come from the 'four 
principles' . 
2. The dominant ideology of the 'four principles' 
The 'four principles' summarize the dominant political ideology in post-
Maoist China. It will be instructive if we analyze these principles. The Chinese 
concept of socialism has two concrete meanings: first, ownership of the means of 
production by the state or by collective units; and second, the principle of 
distribution according to work and the planned economy. The experiment of 
granting autonomy to enterprises and the expansion of the use of the market 
mechanism as a supplement to planning point to a loosening of the system of 
planned economy. The principle of the dictatorship of the peoples's democracy 
is a necessary reaffinnation of the Party's link to Marxism-Leninism. Its main 
function is to legitimize the leadership of the Party. The principle of upholding 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong's thoughts reasserts that_ these ideas are the 
backbone of Chinese socialism. Alternatively, these principles can all be 
reinterpreted under the formula of integrating "the universal principles of 
Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought with the concrete practice of socialist 
mo~ernization and develop it under the new historical conditions" (Beijing 
Review, Dec. 29, 1978). 
Undoubtedly, the leadership of the Party is the "most basic of the 'four 
principles", as Deng Xiaoping emphasized on January 1, 1980. (Remnin Ribao, 
January 1, 1980, p. 1). The theme of the Fifth Plenum held in February 1980 was 
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to strengthen and improve the leadership of the Party, thereby strengthening the 
'monistic center of power' in the society. What this meant was that all power and 
authority of the state should be firmly controlled by the Chinese Communist 
Party. Deng Xiaoping said: "Without the Communist Party's leadership there 
would definitely be great disorder under heaven and the nation would be tom 
apart by disunity. This has been verified by the Chinese history .... Without the 
Party's leadership there will be no socialist system" (Deng Xiaoping 1985,p. 369). 
Ironically, this agrees with Marx's dominant ideology thesis: the idea that 
the dominant class needs to sustain legitimacy through claiming to represent the 
interests of the society as a whole becomes a central feature of political discourse 
(Giddens 1979). So we can see how important it is to the Party to hold fast to 
the 'four principles', which are written into the Chinese Constitution. 
Meanwhile, the Party used its control of education, culture, 
communications media, and the like to propagandize the 'four principles'. In fact, 
Western-style democracy and freedom do not fit the Chinese national conditions 
(Quoqing), because there is no concept of democracy in traditional Chinese 
culture. In several thousand years of Chinese history, there was no democratic 
system like that of ancient Greece. China, a huge society that is only beginning 
to threw off its agrarian legacy, has more than 1 billion people, eighty percent of 
whom are peasant. Most of them have no conception of democracy whatsoever. 
That is why Deng has often argued and pointed out that China's national 
condition--a code word for backwardness--does not allow the country to have as 
much democracy as Western states. "In our situation today," he said in 1979, 
explaining why China must adhere to the 'four principles', "we must do things in 
accordance with Chinese conditions and find a Chinese-style path to 
modernization. Departure from the 'four principles' and talk about democracy in 
the abstract will inevitably lead to the unchecked spread of ultra-democracy and 
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anarchism" (Deng .Xiaoping 1989, p. 22). In 1989, when American President 
George Bush visited Beijing, Deng told Bush, "Ifwe were to run elections among 
China's one billion people now, chaos ... would certainly ensue .... Democracy is our 
goal, but the state must maintain stability" (Beijing Review, January 12-22, 1989, 
p. 16). 
The traditional Chinese notion of the human being emphasized 
responsibilities rather than rights. The Chinese have always defmed themselves 
in terms of their obligations to society, not in terms of what society and 
government owe them. They have never been imbued with the political ideals 
of freedom and human rights so characteristic of the bourgeois industrial 
democracies. There were only endless peasant revolutions and rebellions that 
went right on throughout Chinese history. 
This not to say that the Chinese do not want to be free or endowed with 
human rights, but that with the exception of a small stratum of educated 
intellectuals, most Chinese believe that to take advantage of individual rights is 
to do something selfish. It is in the Chinese cultural heritage to feel that the 
mere act of taking these rights somehow taints them with a suggestion of self-
indulgence, of putting one's own desires ahead of the interests of the group or 
society as a whole. This is both very traditional, in the sense that Confucians 
always emphasized controlling selfish feelings with proper forms of selfless 
behavior and it is also very Marxist. Deng too has always viewed things from the 
standpoint of the good of society as a whole rather than that of the individual. 
China is not a society which emphasizes individualism. And so, while some young 
intellectuals have talked about democracy and human rights, these are not things 
that have come to the Chinese as fundamental aspects of their culture, as they 
have in the West. 
Another thing I want to explain is that Chinese intellectuals are a very 
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small part of China, and it is only in the last few years that most of the younger 
generation have begun to have some contact with outside world. Those things 
which the more extreme advocates of democracy have been asking for may sound 
very familiar to Westerners, but they are quite new to Chinese who may not grasp 
the full implications of Western individualist democracy. The West has the 
historical tradition of democracy and human rights that began with Greek 
civilization more than two thousand years ago. At that time, the first emperor of 
China had established a central authoritarian system. There was no background 
of democracy in Chinese cultural history. Most Chinese are used to authoritarian 
rule after several thousand years of imperial dynasties. 
So, we could say that the young intellectuals who advocate Western 
democracy do not understand Chinese history very well. They do not know about 
the constraints which an agrarian history lays upon political development. 
Actually, the most important thing for China is to develop an strong industrial 
economy and raise people's living standards in a stable social environment. 
Under these situations, it is possible to develop toward more democracy. Thus 
we may better understand Deng's use of the 'four principles'. Otherwise, chaos 
and instability will return to China. 
1,_ Upholding .the 'four principles' against 'bourgeois liberalization' and 
'spiritual pollution' 
In the process of promulgating its dominant ideology, the Party launched 
a series of campaigns to criticize 'bourgeois liberalization' in 1980-1981, and 
'spiritual pollution' in 19 85-19 86, and to crackdown on corruption and 'erroneous 
trend of thoughts' in 1987. The aim of these campaigns was to indoctrinate the 
'four principles' throughout the society and perhaps more importantly among 
intellectual and political elites, because "the dominant ideology is best seen as 
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securing the coherence of the dominant class" (Abercrombie and Turner 1978). 
In this section I want to analyze what 'spiritual pollution' and 'bourgeois 
liberalization' were about. 
In 1983-1985, there was a 'trend of thought' which wanted to use 
'humanism and alienation' to reinterpret Chinese Marxism. Some intellectuals 
who advocated these ideas thought that alienation not only exists in capitalism, 
but also in socialist China. The source of the problem in China was an 
'alienation of power'. This was because the existence of organs of state power 
implies alienation in the political field. In the socialist state the organs of power 
had to be placed above society and to issue orders to their citizens; the 'servants 
of the people' must become the 'masters of the people'. Nepotism, favoritism, 
and patrimonialism were seen as reflections of this alienation of power. These 
thinkers believed that the only way to abolish alienation would be to outlaw the 
leadership of the Party and give up socialism. It was ideas of this sort that Deng 
referred to as 'spiritual pollution'. There were two categories of 'spiritual 
pollution': one was departure from Marxist-Leninism and Maoist thought 
including so-called 'socialist aberrations'; the other was to promulgate bourgeois 
values in order to repudiate the Chinese socialist path. 
Meanwhile the Party defined 'bourgeois liberalization' as denying Marxism 
completely, denying the Chinese socialist system, propagating 'wholesale 
Westernization', following a capitalist path and abolishing the leadership of the 
Party. Scientist Fang Lizhi,ideological theorist Wang Rongwang and Liu Binyan 
were the main proponents. They argued that the 'four principles' were 'outdated, 
rigid, dogmatic concepts and worn-out phrases' that had led China to calamity on 
several occasions. They thought that the only way for China to go was to develop 
a capitalist 'private enterprise system' and 'wholesale Westernization'. To these 
ideas the response of the Party was unambiguous! "No Chinese with pride, 
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confidence, and respect for history and fact will ever endorse this idea of 
'wholesale Westernization"' (People's Daily, March, 1987, p. 1). 
For the Party the only choice was to preclude any other ideologies from 
forming an 'effective opposition' which could cause ideological confusion in the 
society. So the opposition leaders were expelled from the Chinese Communist 
Party. Then the Party used the newspapers, TV. and other media to criticize 
them and pointed out, "Fang Lizhi, Wang Rongwang and Liu Binyan have made 
a series of extremely erroneous speeches advocating bourgeois liberalization. 
They have seriously violated the 'four principles"' (Beijing Review, May 14-23, 
1987, p. 12). The aim of the opposition was to instill the idea of bourgeois 
liberalism into Chinese society, to sow discord between the Party and the people, 
and to incite dissatisfaction with socialism and the Party. Deng Xiaoping said, 
"We must have a peaceful, stable social environment to implement the 'reform 
and openness to the outside world' policy so as to realize modernization. We 
must not allow any people to propagate 'bourgeois liberalization'. If the trend 
of liberalization thought was promulgated pervasively in society, our goal could 
not be achieved. In a word, stability and unity of society in China is the first 
important thing" (Deng Xiaoping, May, 1985). 
In fact, Deng Xiaoping recognized these problems when he advocated the 
'reform and openness to the outside world' policy. In January 1980, he gave a 
speech in which he said: "I should point out that some infiltration of bourgeois 
ideology is inevitable because of the non-socialist ideas that already exist in our 
Party and country, the ten-year rampage of 'cultural revolution' and the fact that 
we need to develop diplomatic and trade relations with capitalist countries .... that 
is why it is necessary to stress repeatedly that we must adhere to the 'four 
principles' .... When we study the technology and management experience of 
capitalist society, we must never allow ourselves to worship capitalist countries, 
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to succumb to corrosive capitalist. influences, or to lose the national pride and 
self-confidence of socialist China. We must eradicate resolutely the trend toward 
bourgeois liberalization that is emerging within the Party and society" (Deng 
Xiaoping, 1980, A Speech in the Fifth Plenum of the Conference of the Party). 
From his speech, we see clearly that Deng knew how to wield the dominant 
ideology so as to maintain social stability and unity. 
During ten years of stability from 1978 to 1988, the Party was pragmatic 
in promoting economic modernization and conservative in politics to keep social 
order. As a matter of fact, Deng and the Party achieved enormous economic 
results. First, in agriculture, Deng disbanded the communes and leased the land 
back to the peasant households for private management. This increased the value 
of agriculture output as well as gained the support of eighty hundred million 
peasants. Second, in commerce and industry, Deng allowed the growth of small 
individual and collective factories, stores, and service trades. This private and 
semi-private sector has grown rapidly, employs a large portion of the labor force 
and produces at least a fifth of China's industrial product (Beijing: Zhongguo 
tongji chubanshe, 1988,p. 287). People's living standards were raised enormously. 
Third, Deng opened up the Chinese economy to foreign trade and investment. 
So far, over seventy-nine billion US dollars of foreign investment has flowed into 
China, and foreign trade now constitutes twenty-eight percent of the GNP 
(Beijing Review 32:10, March 6-12, 1989). All of this has resulted from 
developing the national economy in a stable social and political environment. 
4.,_ Retrospect: the situation of the Chinese dominant ideology after 
June 4th 1989 
Although the May-June demonstrations were peaceful and did not seek to 
overthrow communism or the ruling Party, Deng labeled them a 'counter-
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revolutionary rebellion' because of their demand for independent political 
organizations and free press. These demands threatened the single party system 
(Nathan 1990). So, when some intellectuals wanted to share power with the Party 
through propagating the oppositional ideology of 'bourgeois liberalization' and 
'wholesale westernization', the Party pointed out that they did not represent 
eighty hundred million peasants. If spurred to rebellion, these 'garbage' would 
cause chaos. What most Chinese actually want is for the 'reform and openness 
to the outside world' policies to continue. They want the society to remain stable 
so that they can increase their living standards. 
Deng said again: "Ifwe allow demonstrations in China with more than one 
billion people, how can we maintain stability? In an unstable country, nothing 
could be achieved" (Deng Xiaoping, April 25, 1989 Speech in Beijing, See World 
Affair, Vol.152, No.3, 1989-90). The new General Secretary Jiang Zeming 
reiterated 'The June 4th Turmoil' had set out to " .... subvert the socialist system 
and ... tum China into a bourgeois republic and an appendage of the big Western 
imperialist powers". This would be the result of 'bourgeois liberalization'. So, the 
Party called for strengthening and insisting on the 'four principles', especially 
building the leadership of the Party at all levels in order to safeguard the socialist 
path. Jiang emphasized that it would have been impossible to make the great 
advances after 1978 without insisting on the 'four principles'. 'The June 4th 
Turmoil' happened in China because the two former General Secretaries did not 
give unswerving support to the hegemony of the Party and instead supported 
'bourgeois liberalization'. Jiang said that China must uphold the basic principles 
of the Party; it should never have permitted the use of the policy of 'reforming 
to develop socialist commodity economy' as a cover to propagate capitalist 
ideology such as 'democracy, freedom and human-rights'. 
As soon as the Tiananmen Massacre was over, the Party began a campaign 
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of ideological education in all levels of Chinese society. People were required to 
study the speeches of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zeming as well as relevant 
articles in People's Daily. They were required to write self-assessment reports 
during the Spring of 1989 --with particular emphasis on their behavior (the 
important criterion being whether or not they had taken part in the June 4th 
Turmoil). Further appraisals took place at unit or group meetings. Finally, 
individual cases were examined by higher-level Party authorities. (When I was 
in China, I experienced that campaign.) The Chinese Party not only used mass 
media to indoctrinate the 'four principles', but also used coercive methods to 
purge people's minds and bodies to achieve its aim of hegemony. And they 
stepped up the censorship of all heterodox views ( especially bourgeois 
liberalization). 
The Chinese Party has continued to follow the 'four principles'. Jiang 
Zeming made a speech at the meeting of the Central Committee on Oct. 22, 
1991. He emphasized the need to continue ideological work in the Party in order 
to prevent some of its members (including some high leaders such as Zhao 
Zhiyang, Hu Yaobang and others) from straying from the 'four principles'. 
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Summary 
In the process of industrialization in China, the most important objective 
may be to maintain a stable social and political environment and to continue the 
policy of 'reform and openness to the outside world' , although this means 
continuing conservatism in politics. If the argument of Lenski et al. (1991) is 
correct, industrialization will eventually force political liberalization in China. 
Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, all had one party systems before they 
achieved great success in their national economies. After the economic 
foundations were established, they began to adjust and reform their single party 
dictatorships and gradually moved toward more democratic societies. These 
countries took a long time to shift away from a despotic political structure to 
democracy, and they are still struggling for it. So, it is important and necessary 
for China to approach political reform gradually. The comment of the ancient 
Chinese philosopher Lao Zhi is appropriate: " Ruling a large kingdom is indeed 
like cooking small fish" (Lao Zhi 1963, p. 287, See Aurthur Waley). Change can 
only be accomplished with great care, and in small steps. 
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Conclusions. 
Technological innovation exerts a strong influence on human societies, 
because an advance in the technological base is a necessary precondition for any 
substantial growth or development in terms of size, complexity, power, and 
wealth. Technology impacts social, political and economic structures; and these 
structures, in tum, react on technology and influence its further development 
(Lenski et al. 1991). In two thousand years of Chinese history, the technological 
base scarcely changed while the imperial polity and Confucianism were equally 
persistent. During the twentieth century, China entered the industrial era, but 
still technological change came slowly. Thus, even after the 1949 Revolution, the 
new polity seemed more like the imperial system it replaced than the government 
of an industrialized country. Mao Zedong became like a new emperor and 
Marxist-Leninism tempered with Mao's thought was a new dominant ideology. 
In recent decades, however, China has undergone a steady trend toward 
industrialization, and this has challenged the traditional agrarian pattern of the 
polity. I have sketched this trend in the preceding chapters ( see Table 17 for a 
summary). 
After 10 years of reform--"the second revolution" (Harding 1987)--the 
market already plays a huge role in China's economy, with nearly half its 
industrial output coming from non-state companies. The challenge Deng has set 
is to introduce market principles of competition and efficiency to state enterprises 
and thereby to decentralize economic decision making. The results are owing to 
the strong pragmatism of the current leaders. Deng Xiaoping expressed it best, 
with characteristic conciseness: When some complained that his program of 
economic reform was a reintroduction of capitalism, he responded that it does not 
matter whether a cat is black or white as long as it catches mice. 
The political elite appears determined to stick with pragmatic policies. 
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The present Communist Party Congress of China opened a crucial meeting on 
Oct. 12, 1992 by vowing to pursue supreme leader Deng Xiaoping's pragmatist 
reform for 100 years. The Party leader said: "We can truly say that we have 
begun a new revolution, the objective of which is to fundamentally change the 
economic structure that has hampered the development of the productive forces 
and to establish a new and vigorous socialist economic structure" (Jiang Zeming, 
Oct. 12, 1992). 
Due to the world-wide influence of industrialization the most important 
political trend in the twentieth century has been the spread of democracy. Lenski 
et al. (1991) suggest that as industrializing agrarian societies continue to 
modernize their technological base and economy there may be an increasing 
movement toward developing more democratic political institutions. This trend 
is visible today in Post-Maoist China, although the movement is slow. Political 
leaders continue to believe that economic reform can be accomplished without 
political liberalization and western-style democracy. The banner of the recent 
Party Congress reads "Insist on the Socialist Road under the Guidance ofMarxist-
Leninist-Maoism with Chinese Characteristics". China's leaders are committed 
to rapid economic modernization while they are extremely cautious about 
democratization. But elsewhere in Asia authoritarian regimes have found that 
economic growth almost invariably brings about demand for democratization from 
emerging middle classes. The calls for political reform and greater democracy 
will also increase in China as industrialization continues. 
Attribute of the system 
How leader(s) view process of change 
Prefer:c:ed method of policy implementation 
Intrusiveness of the state 
Main tasks of governmental 
bureaucracy 
Dominant ideology 
Mechanisms for integrating the polity 
Techniques for controlling political power 
Extent of political 'institutionalization' 
Nature of politics at top level 
Rule at top 
Dominant organizational hierarchies 
Table 17. Evolution of the Chinese Political Structure 
Imperial China 




Maintain legitimacy and 





Sovereign emperor and 
endless political purges 
Very low, rule of men totally 
Struggles between emperor's 




law families and eunuchs; 
military force 
Maoist China 
Continuous revolution to 
prevent backsliding 
Class struggle, mobilization 
Of populace 
Totally through 'small group' 
rituals 
Continual revolution, elimination 
of lingering bourgeois influences 
Maoism 
Networks of personal relations, 
coercion 
Endless campaigns, purges 
Low, rule of men rather than 
institutions 
Unbridled factionalism below top 
leader 
One-man rule 
Chinese Communist Party 
People's Liberation Army 
public security 
Post-Maoist China 
Reform; gradual economic change 
under conservative ideology 
More pragmatism; autonomy to 
provincial and local units 
Pursuit of some private interests 
and withdrawal tolerated 
Changing economic structure toward 
socialist market economy, empha-
sizing efficiency 
Deng's 'four principles' 
Networks of personal relations, 
partially regularized personnel 
system, partial market competition, 
coercion 
Partial campaigns but to some extent 
obey the regularity of a more rational-
legal bureaucracy 
Still low, but approaching a 
modem bureaucracy 
Struggles still remain but emphasizing 
unity to develop the national economy 
Collective leadership, patron-clients 
Party committee chain of command, 
Propaganda Dept., State planning 
Commission, Ministry of Finance, army, 
public security forces; provincial and 
local government departments 
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Appendix 1. Definition of Codes (From Tuden and Marshall, 1972) 
Police 
The following symbols indicate _ the degree of specialization and 
institutionalization _ of police functions. 
o Police functions are not specialized or institutionalized at any level of 
political integration, the maintenance of law and order being left 
exclusively to informal mechanisms of social control, to private retaliation, 
or to sorcery. 
i There is only incipient specialization, as when groups with other functions 
are assigned police functions in emergencies, eg., military societies at a 
Plains Indian annual sun dance and buffalo hunt. 
r Police functions are assumed by the retainers of chiefs. 
m Police functions are assumed by the military organization. 
s Police functions are specialized and institutionalized on at least some level 
or levels of political integration. 
Levels of Sovereignty 
The symbols below indicate the level of effective sovereignty, defmed as 
the highest level of indigenous political integration at which functionaries have 
and commonly exercise the power to enforce important decisions at subordinate 
levels in the political structure--notable to compel participation in warfare, to 
collect taxes or tribute, and /or to exact sanctions for major delict. Unless at 
least one of these powers is found at a particular level, a lack of effective 
sovereignty is assumed for that level. 
A Absence of effective sovereignty at any level transcending that of the local 
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community, ie., a stateless society. 
B Effective sovereignty occurs at the first (but no higher) level of political 
integration above the local community, as in the case of a petty paramount 
chief ruling a district composed of a number of local communities. 
C Effective sovereignty occurs at the second (but no higher) level of political 
integration above the local community, as in the case of a small state 
comprising a number of administrative districts under subordinate 
functionaries. 
D Effective sovereignty is found at the third ( or higher) level of political 
integration above the local community, as in the case of a large state 
divided into administrative provinces which are further subdivided into 
lesser administrative districts. 
Deliberative and Consultative Bodies 
The following symbols indicate the composition of a deliberative body 
which exercises or shares supreme decision-making authority at the level of 
effective sovereignty, as indicated by C or S of Executive . A bicameral legislature 
with different modes of selection is indicated by two letters. 
0 Absence of a supreme deliberative body. 
A An aristocratic deliberative body whose membership is hereditary or 
otherwise confined to ascribed statuses and is representative primarily of 
a ruling class or classes, eg., a council of nobles. 
C A deliberative council whose members are appointed by, but are relatively 
independent of, the chief executive, a ruling clique or party, or particularly 
designated .electors at the same level of political integration, eg., a 
supreme soviet. 
R A deliberative body representative of several or all of the state's major 
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class or ethnic components. 
E An elective legislature or parliament chosen independently by the franchise 
of a substantial proportion of the free citizenry. 
Executive 
0 Absence of effective sovereignty, and consequently of executive 
functionaries, at any level above that of the local community. 
C Supreme decision-making authority is vested in a council, assembly, or 
other deliberative body with no single executive other than at best a 
presiding officer. 
S Supreme decision-making authority is shared more or less equally by a 
single ( or plural) executive and a deliver body, eg., a king, president or 
prime minister and a supreme council or parliament. 
P Supreme decision-making authority is vested in a single authoritative 
leader, eg., a paramount chief, king, or dictator, however much he may in 
fact be influenced by advisors. 
Administrative Hierarchy 
The following symbols indicate the type of subordinate functionaries who 
occupy the most influential statuses at the level of political integration 
immediately below that characterized by effective sovereignty, and the 
relationship of these functionaries to the supreme executive. 
A Absence of effective sovereignty at any level above that of the local 
community. 
P The principal subordinate functionaries are popular assemblies, councils 
of notables, or other plural (rather than individual) statuses which 
represent their constituencies and enjoy a substantial measure of 
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independence vis-a-vis the supreme executive. 
K The principal subordinate functionaries are heads of component kin groups 
rather than of territorial divisions of the state, and owe their positions 
primarily to kinship principles. 
D The principal subordinate functionaries are heads of territorial divisions 
of the state who enjoy a substantial degree of decentralized independence 
vis-a-vis the supreme executive. 
S The principal subordinate functionaries are head of territorial divisions of 
the state who are closely supervised by the supreme executive and form 
part of a centralized administrative system. 
+ A plus following a letter indicates the presence of a deliberative body 
which shares authority at this level. 
Selection of Subordinate Officials 
The following symbols indicate the prevailing mode of succession to the 
statuses of the principal subordinate administrative functionaries. 
o Absence of effective sovereignty at any level above , that of the local 
community. 
p Patrilineal succession. 
m Matrilineal succession. 
h Hereditary succession within a ruling lineage or other privileged group, the 
particular individual choice being determined by some special elective or 
appointive procedure. 
s Succession is based primarily on seniority or age/ 
i Informal recognition on the basis of personal influence, prestige, or wealth. 
e Formal election by their constituencies. 
a Appointment by the supreme executive. 
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Judiciary 
The following symbols indicate the locus of supreme judicial jurisdiction 
(normally appellate) at the level of effective sovereignty. 
0 Supreme judicial authority is lacking at any level above that of the local 
community. 
L Supreme judicial· authority exists at a level above that of the local 
community but below that of effective sovereignty. 
E Supreme judicial authority is exercised by the supreme executive, eg., the 
king is also the supreme judge, the council is also the supreme curt. 
I Supreme juridical authority is vested in a functionary or functionaries who 
are appointed by the supreme executive and /or the supreme deliberative 
body but are at least relatively independent of the appointing authority. 
P Supreme judicial authority is independent of the political system and is 
vested in a priesthood or other primarily religious functionaries. 
H Supreme judicial authority is exercised by independent hereditary 
functionaries. 
Advisory Bodies 
The following symbols indicate the composition of political bodies or 
groups at the same level which have important advisory or consultative functions 
but do not have independent or co-ordinate decision-making powers. 
o Absence of effective sovereignty at any level above that of the local 
community. 
n Absence of a separate consultative body. 
r The principal advisors of the supreme executive are his ( or their) close 
relatives, eg., members of the royal family or lineage. 
f The principal advisors are a coterie of personal favorites of the supreme 
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executive (or of influential council members), among whom neither close 
relatives nor sodality mates predominate, eg., royal courtiers, a 'kitchen 
cabinet'. 
s The principal advisors are members of a secret society, cult group, age-
grade, or other sodality. 
y The advisory body is composed of representatives of subordinate groups. 
z The consultative body is otherwise constituted, eg., composed of 
individuals with hereditary status. 
a The principal advisors are administrative functionaries, eg. , the heads of 
administrative departments, a president's or prime minister's cabinet. 
Selection of Executive 
The following symbols indicate the mode of selection of supreme executive 
functionaries other than members of an authoritative council or deliberative body. 
o Absence of effective sovereignty, and consequently of executive 
functionaries at any level above that of the local community. 
p Succession is hereditary and patrilineal, normally from father to son. 
q The same except that a brother takes precedence over a son. 
m Succession is hereditary and matrilineal, normally from Mobr to SiSo. 
n The same except that a brother takes precedence over a nephew. 
f Succession is hereditary within a ruling family (or group of families), the 
choice among potential heirs being made by the family, the predecessor, 
a council, or special functionaries with electoral powers. 
1 Succession is nonhereditary and is determined by a body of limited size, 
eg., a ruling clique, a particular political party, or a small body of 
designated elector. This symbol is to be used instead of e when elections 
are merely a stereotyped confirmation of the decision of a limited power 
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group. 
c The single ( or plural) executive is elected or otherwise chosen by a council 
or other deliberative body. In the absence of such an executive, the same 
symbol can be employed for the presiding officer of the supreme council. 
i Succession ·is through informal recognition on the basis of personal 
qualifications. 
e Succession is nonhereditary but a formal electoral procedure which is 
participated in by a substantial proportion of the free citizenry. 
a The single ( or plural) executive is an appointee of a dominant alien 
society, eg., a colonial power. 
s The succession is determined primarily by supernatural means, eg., 
divination. 
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Appendix 2. Coded data on Political Organization of Agrarian Societies 
HE 
p X J 
0 E u 
ID LEVSOV 1 C SELEXECl DCBODl ABODl D POLICE ADHIER SELSUBO 
33 3 3 4 5 0 7 2 5 3 
37 3 4 4 1 0 2 3 4 5 7 
42 2 1 3 0 1 2 0 1 5 
43 3 4 2 1 4 7 1 4 5 7 
44 1 2 4 1 0 2 4 1 
45 3 2 4 1 0 1 2 3 5 7 
47 3 2 2 7 4 7 3 4 6 7 
48 2 2 1 1 3 1 2 0 3 1 
49 3 2 4 5 0 2 2 4 5 7 
50 2 2 4 0 7 3 4 5 7 
51 2 4 2 7 2 7 3 4 6 6 
54 3 4 4 7 0 7 1 4 6 6 
56 3 2 4 5 0 3 2 4 5 7 
59 3 4 2 . 4 7 3 4 4 8 
62 3 4 2 10 2 7 3 4 4 8 
63 3 4 2 10 2 7 3 4 4 8 
64 1 0 4 1 0 2 2 0 5 7 
67 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
68 1 0 4 1 0 1 2 4 3 1 
71 3 4 2 7 3 7 3 4 3 6 
73 3 0 2 1 1 1 1 4 5 7 
75 3 2 4 5 0 2 2 4 5 7 
76 3 4 4 0 7 3 4 5 7 
83 3 4 4 7 0 5 3 4 5 7 
84 3 4 4 7 0 5 3 4 5 7 
113 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
114 3 4 4 7 0 6 3 4 5 7 
115 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
116 3 4 4 7 0 7 3 4 5 7 
117 3 0 2 7 4 7 3 4 3 6 
Number of cases read= 30 Number of cases listed= 30 











Appendix 3: Code Book 
CROSS-CULTURAL CODES (SCCS) 
POLICE 
o=0 i=l r=2 m=3 s=4 
LEVELS OF SOVEREIGNTY 
A=0 B=l C=2 D=3 
DELIBERATIVE AND CONSULATIVE BODIES 
O=0 A=l C=2 R=3 E=4 
EXECUTIVE 
O=0 C=l S=2 P=3 L=4 
ADMINISTRATIVE IIlERARCHY 
A=0 P=l K=2 D=3 D+=4 
S=5 S+=6 
SELECTION OF SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS 
o=0 p=l m=2 h=3 s=4 i=5 
e=6 a=7 ah=8 
JUDICIARY 
O=0 L=l E=2 1=3 P=4 H=5 
HIGHER POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 
o=0 p=l a=2 c=3 i=4 
ADVISORY BODIES 
o=0 n=l r=2 f=3 s=4 y=5 
z=6 a=7 
SELECTION OF EXECUTIVE 
o=0 p=l q=2 m=3 m=4 f=5 
1=6 c=7 i=8 e=9 a=lO s=ll 
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